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ABSTRACT 
Existing literature and theories related to the separation of ownership and control and its impact 
on companies' financial performance, including dividend payment have left this subject in state of 
ambiguity and uncleamess, with various contradictions and inconsistencies being noted. 
In order to establish whether there is a significant difference in financial performance between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control, this study has used appropriate mathematical and statistical 
methods for data processing and analysis. 
Results obtained from the study have revealed the existence of a significant difference in financial 
performance between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, 
as measured in terms of profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment_ 
The analysis has indicated that management-controlled companies have been more efficient, more 
mature financially and paying higher dividends, out of earnings available to shareholders, than 
their owner-controlled counterparts. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
According to the main body of finance literature, the financial performance of a company 
should not depend on its ownership structure, be it privately held, publicly held, owner-
controlled1 or management-controlled2, since the primary management objective should 
be the maximisation of the shareholders' wealth, which is expected to govern the strategic 
vision and direction of the operations. 
The reason why the maximisation of the shareholders' wealth should be considered as the 
primary objective of any manager has been explained by Le Roux, Venter, Jansen van 
Vuren, Kritzinger, Ferreira, de Beer, Huber, Jacobs and Labuschagne (1995:178) in a 
financially simplified manner. According to them, when one invests capital in a company, 
thereby becoming owner or shareholder, his aim is to earn a certain return on his 
investment. It is therefore the company's responsibility to ensure that its shareholders or 
owners earn that return on their investment. 
While for a listed company the maximisation of wealth can be described in terms of the 
market price of its ordinary shares, for a non-listed one this should be measured in terms 
of the return on the capital invested which should contribute to the increase in the 
company's value. 
1 An owner-controlled company is defined in this study as the one in which more than 
50 % of the voting stock is held by its managers/executive directors (See subsection 
1.4.2). 
2 A management-controlled company is defined in this study as a company in which 
ownership and control are separated. Managers are appointed by shareholders who do 
not participate in business decisions and operational control. (See subsection 1.4.3). 
From a purely pragmatic point of view, it is believed that in a market economy everyone 
fares best in the long run when management puts shareholders first. With business being 
seen as the greatest engine of wealth in society, improving the commonweal is the real 
reason why maximising shareholders' wealth is so important1. 
According to Brigham and Gapenski (1990:5,6), however, the maximisation of the 
shareholders' wealth is not always the primary objective retained by all companies, as 
managers who drive the business are also interested in their own satisfaction, in 
employees' welfare and in the good of both their communities and societies at large. They 
are of the opinion that managers oflarge and well-entrenched companies, for example, 
could work to keep shareholder returns at a fair and reasonable level and then devote part 
of their efforts and resources to public service activities, to employee benefits, to higher 
executive salaries or to golf 
This view is also supported by Van Home (1974:6) who states: "Maximisation of 
shareholders' wealth is an appropriate guide for how a company should act, but not 
necessarily how it does act." 
It is evident that in pursuing financial goals, the objectives of the owner-managers and 
those of the non-owner managers cannot always be identical, which generally results in 
different strategies and therefore can also lead to a difference in the financial performance 
between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies. 
The problem being researched in this study consists in establishing whether there is a 
significant difference in financial performance between owner-controlled and management-
controlled companies in South Africa, due to the separation of ownership and control. 
1 This view is comprehensively explained by Al Ehrbar (1998:16). 
-2-
This is expected to provide a better understanding of problems facing companies' 
management in South Africa and to facilitate the implementation of corrective actions if 
deemed necessary. Various questions concerning the equity investors' choice are also 
expected to be clarified. 
A research of a quasi-similar nature was conducted on privately and publicly held 
companies in the United States.in 1977 by R.F. Demong for the degree ofDoctor of 
Business Administration at the Graduate School of the University of Colorado. 
Scrutiny of the methodology used by Demong during the above mentioned research has 
revealed numerous weaknesses which could impact negatively on the research results as 
explained below. 
Firstly, due to the fact the treatment sample consisted of private companies which 
converted to public companies, thereby being evaluated as privately held (with united 
ownership and control) for a period of three years prior to the initial issue and publicly 
held (with separated ownership and control) during the three years thereafter, the risk of 
data distortion had been found to be increased, as the researcher did not take into account 
the situations where certain converted companies could still be controlled by their owners 
who did not relinquish control after going public and hence retained the majority 
shareholding. 
In this regard, it should be emphasised that the selling of shares is always the decision of 
the owners who, as controlling capitalists, wish to expand their companies and further 
interests. If these capitalists are rational and utility-maximising individuals, they will 
consistently wish to retain control. 
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This view is the one supported by Pitelis (1987:3) who states : "That capitalists will find it 
more beneficial to relinquish control is not self-evident and has not been demonstrated. 
That capitalists cannot expand and retain control appears implausible, given that in an ex-
ante sense both the decision to sell shares and the extent to which shares are sold are the 
capitalists' own decisions." 
As mentioned here above the research conducted by Demong did not consider the 
situations where owner-managers (capitalists) did not relinquish control during the three 
years period which followed the initial issue. 
Secondly, the analysis of the same companies prior to going public as privately held and 
thereafter as publicly held, in order to generate conclusions in respect of their financial 
performance, could not ensure the effectiveness of control over external factors related to 
the changing socioeconomic environment, as companies have been evaluated under 
different periods. This was exacerbated by the fact that the shareholding structure of the 
publicly held companies, constituting the control sample, was not appropriately scrutinised 
and taken in consideration in the research design. 
Finally, it has been noted that Demong' s research also failed to specifically analyse the 
main aspects of the difference in financial performance between privately held and publicly 
held companies, seen as a result of the separation of their ownership and control. 
Apart from the above mentioned research, there is another issue which has been 
interestingly debated in the area of the separation of ownership and control and which 
cannot be ignored in this study. This issue concerns the managerial attitude towards risks 
associated with the business. In this regard, various theories have been developed, with 
most of them being found to be contradictory. 
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For example, when on the one hand Monsen and Downs (1965:225) and Baumol 
( 1967: 102) claim that: "Managers of management-controlled companies are more risk 
adverse than those of the owner-controlled ones"; Palmer (1973b:228) and Stano 
(1976:677) on the other hand hypothesise that: "Managers of companies with a diffused 
ownership will be willing to take more risks than those of owner-controlled companies." 
Although the above theories are conflicting with regard to the attitude of managers 
towards risks, depending on their relationship with the company (owners or non-owners), 
they still recognise that ownership and control can be dissociated, which can consequently 
affect the financial performance. 
This view is totally rajected by those writers who argue that ownership and control will 
always stay together and partially by those who accept the separation but still believe that 
it does not have any impact on the company's financial performance. More details in 
connection with theories formulated in the area of ownership and control are presented in 
the next chapter. 
In terms of this research and considering the availability ofrequired data, only industrial 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange have been selected for analysis and 
divided into two categories, namely owner-controlled and management-controlled, based 
on a scrutiny of their ownership structure. The company classification is fully explained in 
chapter 3 which covers the research methodology. 
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1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In support of the assumption that objectives and goals of owner-controlled companies are 
different from those of management-controlled companies, one cannot disregard the 
existence of differences in their respective financial strategies and, since these strategies 
are considered as the manner in which the company is financed and operated and the 
pattern in which its funds are invested, it is deemed pertinent to believe that they will 
affect the financial performance, as measured in terms of profitability, asset management, 
liquidity, leverage and dividend payment'_ 
The primary objective ofthis research is to establish whether there is a significant 
difference in financial performance between owner-controlled and management-controlled 
companies in South Africa, as a result of the separation of ownership and control_ 
Should it be established that there is a difference, the main aspects of the difference will be 
analysed so as to facilitate the implementation of corrective and value-adding actions 
where deemed necessary. 
In addition, the study is intended to positively contribute to the theory of financial 
management of owner-controlled and management-controlled companies and provide the 
necessary clarification with regard to the various statements and assumptions related to 
the separation of ownership and control and its impact on the company's financial 
performance. 
1 The impact of the environment including financial strategies on the financial performance 
is explained by Le Roux et al (1995:79, 182). 
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1.3 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
CHAPIERl: 
This chapter is the introduction to the research. It provides the reader with the 
background to the problem being researched and specifies the objectives of the study, as 
presented in sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. 
Subsequent to this dissertation outline, the chapter covers the definition of operational 
terms, the formulation of the research hypothesis, the presentation of the study importance 
as well as major limitations and key assumptions. 
CHAPTER2: 
Chapter two presents the review of existing literature in respect of the separation of 
ownership and control, the impact ofthis separation on the company's financial 
performance as well as on the dividend payment. 
Various inconsistencies and contradictions which exist in this area are fully discussed. 
CHAPTER3: 
The third chapter covers the research methodology. It gives the description of the 
population covered by the study, explains the types and sources of the research data as 
well as the sampling strategies utilised. 
The chapter ends with the explanation of the methods used for processing and analysis of 
data (hypothesis-testing), which include the pooled-variance t tests performed on two 
samples with numerical data. 
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CHAPTER4: 
Using the research methodology as explained in chapter three, this chapter covers the 
hypothesis-testing as well as a comparative analysis of data (financial ratios) related to the 
financial aspects under scrutiny, namely, profitability, asset management, liquidity, 
leverage and dividend payment. 
It should be remembered that the main purpose of the research design is to identify and 
analyse possible differences in financial performance between the owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
CHAPTERS: 
This chapter summarises the results emanating from the research. It discusses the 
conclusions reached from the analysis of the research data and presents suggestions for 
further study. 
1.4 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
1.4.1 PRIVATELY HELD VERSUS PUBLICLY HELD COMPANY 
A privately held company is a company generally owned by a few people and whose 
shares are not traded in the public market. It can also be called a private company. This is 
opposed to a publicly held company which is owned by the general public, including 
individuals and institutional investors and for which the stock is listed on an exchange and 
traded in the public market. 
A publicly held company must file financial statements and reports with the Registrar and 
the Stock Exchange. 
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1.4.2 OWNER-CONTROLLED COMPANY 
This study defines an owner-controlled company as the one in which more than 50 % of 
the voting shares are held by individuals who actively participate in the running of the 
business. These individuals are generally Managers (Executive Directors) of the company 
whose area of actions is not only limited to the definition of broad corporate objectives 
and taking of strategic decisions, but also includes tactical decisions which regulate the 
day-to-day business activities. 
Both privately held and publicly held companies can be owner-controlled/managed. 
1.4.3 MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED COMPANY 
A management-controlled company is considered as the one in which ownership and 
control are separated. Managers are appointed by shareholders who do not participate in 
business decisions and operational control. 
In most instances, management-controlled companies are owned directly or indirectly (via 
other companies) by institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, which represent savings/interests of the general public. 
1.4.4 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
According to Le Roux et al (1995:172) financial management refers to the management of 
the company's financial activities, with the financial manager being responsible for the 
effective planning, organisation, co-ordination, delegation and control of all the financial 
activities in the company as he strives to achieve the company's primary objective. 
The role played by a financial manager is found to be extremely important since the 
effectiveness and efficiency of most operations are measured in financial terms. 
-9-
Traditionally, financial management was seen as an activity within a company which 
focussed solely on obtaining or raising capital. In this approach, little or no attention was 
given to the company's daily problems regarding the financial function. 
Contrary to the above, the modem approach to financial management is directed at both 
the raising and the application of funds, with the three basic decisions taken by the 
financial manager being delineated as.follows : 
+ Financing decisions, covering the sources and forms of finance as well as the costs 
related to the financing of capital requirements; 
+ Investment decisions, including all the fixed and current assets of the company; and 
+ Dividend decisions, referring to the decisions which have been made with regard to 
the retention of earnings for re-investment and payment of dividends to 
shareholders. 
1.4.5 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Seen in the light of the financial management function as defined above, the financial 
performance of a company can be considered as the result of its management of the 
financing, investments (use of funds) and operations. 
It is deemed important to mention that strategies adopted by management, incentives, 
dividend decisions as well as the socioeconomic environment in which a company operates 
are all the factors that can affect the financial performance. This being the case, a proper 
evaluation of the financial performance of a company due to its management's efforts 
must effectively control the impact of the socioeconomic conditions. 
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In this study, the financial performance of owner-controlled and management-controlled 
companies is evaluated through the analysis of specific financial ratios related to 
profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment. 
The selected financial ratios have been found able to facilitate a comprehensive evaluation 
of the financial performance of a company due to its management's efforts in the 
environment where the effects of the general economic and specific industrial conditions 
are adequately controlled. These financial ratios are reflected in Table 1.1. 
FINANCIAL ASPECT FINANCIAL RATIOS 
I.PROFITABILITY PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS 
RETURN ON EQUITY 
2.ASSET MANAGEMENT FIXED ASSET TURNOVER 
TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER 
3.LIQUIDITY CURRENT RATIO 
4.LEVERAGE TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY 
TOT AL DEBT TOT AL ASSETS 
LONG-TERM DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 
5.DIVIDEND PAYMENT DIVIDEND PAY-OUT RATIO 
Table 1.1 : Financial aspects and financial ratios. 
Supporting the use of the financial ratios in a financial performance evaluation, Le Roux et 
al (1995: 182) state : "During the process of analysis, financial performance is evaluated on 
the basis of specific norms. One of the methods used in these analyses is financial ratio 
analysis, which helps the financial manager to make certain deductions and conclusions 
regarding the financial position of the company." 
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Although, ratios analysis is found to be the most publicised and commonly used method of 
financial statements interpretation, since certain fundamental relationships of items in 
financial statements are emphasised by stating them in the form ofratios, it is deemed 
important to mention that the use of financial ratios is only significant when comparisons 
can be made, either between two different accounting periods for one company or 
between two companies or groups of companies, possibly providing the same service. 
In this study, processing and analysis of data gathered for the evaluation of financial 
performance are undertaken through the use of appropriate mathematical and statistical 
methods, as explained in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
1.5 FORMULATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
The basic research hypothesis is that there is a significant difference between the financial 
performance of owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, 
as measured in terms of profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend 
payment, using the relevant financial ratios. 
Considering this research hypothesis, only an adequately structured and effectively 
conducted analysis of the selected financial ratios related to the above mentioned financial 
aspects can lead to its acceptance or rejection. 
It should be noted that the null hypothesis which will be statistically tested in this regard is 
that there is no difference in financial performance between owner -controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa, as measured in terms of profitability, 
asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment, using the relevant financial 
ratios. 
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1.6 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
In concluding his research on the financial performance of privately held and publicly held 
companies in the United States, Demong (1977:114) suggested that a study of the 
implication of the separation of ownership and control of small- to medium-sized 
companies be conducted in order to validate his findings. 
Although Demong expressed the necessity of replicating a similar research, qualifying his 
work as the starting point for further study in the area of financial management of private 
companies, anomalies and weaknesses identified in his methodology justify the importance 
of analysing the financial performance of companies in which the ownership and control 
situation is not ambiguous. 
In addition, in the management studies pertaining to ownership, control and ideology, 
Nichols (1969:13) states: "Quite obviously, we hope that further research will confirm 
our findings but we have sought to arrange the text so as to draw attention to the fact that 
the Northern City study is, and can only be the beginning." 
Due to existing theories in respect of ownership and control being inconclusive and in the 
majority of instances contradictory, this study is designed to enhance the body of the 
financial literature by providing the necessary clarifications in this area. 
Furthermore, in analysing the financial performance of owner-controlled and management-
controlled companies, including a scrutiny of the main aspects affected by the difference, 
should this exist, this study is expected to provide a better understanding of problems 
facing management of these two types of companies in South Africa and facilitate the 
implementation of corrective and value-adding actions where deemed necessary. It is also 
believed that it will assist equity investors in making intelligent investment decisions. 
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1. 7 MAJOR LIMITATIONS AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
This study is designed to establish whether there is a significant difference in financial 
performance between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South 
Africa, as a result of the separation of ownership and control and to analyse the main 
aspects of the difference, should it exist. 
The analysis performed in this research is limited to specific financial ratios related to 
profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment which are used 
as surrogates for the financial performance of companies under evaluation. 
The study is not intended to determine the correlation between the financial performance 
measures and the companies' share prices as this falls outside the scope. 
As mentioned in section I. I, only companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
have been selected for this study and divided into two groups, namely owner-controlled 
and management-controlled, in terms of their shareholding structure. 
The study covers the period from 1989 to 1995, thereby analysing the financial 
performance of the two groups of companies for seven years. 
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CHArTER2 
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although various theories' have been fonnulated in the area of ownership and control, 
little has been done with regard to the evaluation of how the financial perfonnance of 
companies can be affected by the separation of these two concepts. 
Review ofliterature related to the separation of ownership and control highlights a 
number ofinconsistencies and contradictions. For example, while certain economists and 
financial writers, such as the orthodox neoclassical economists, argue that ownership and 
control can never be separated, others like Monsen and Downs (1965) and Baumol (1967) 
claim that ownership and control are united in the owner-controlled companies and 
separated in the management-controlled ones. 
In this chapter, theories rejecting the possibility of a separation between ownership and 
control (non-supporting theories) and those supporting that these two concepts can be 
separated (supporting theories) are examined. 
It should be noted that the review of the supporting theories also covers the literature 
linking the separation of ownership and control to a company's finanfarperfonnance as 
well as dividend payment. 1 
1 These theories include, inter alia, the managerialism of Berle and Means (1932), 
Dahrendorf (1957) and Burnham (1962) as well as various other theories on the 
separation of ownership and control, as referred to in this chapter. 
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2.2 NON-SUPPORTING TIJEORIES 
There are economists, mainly the orthodox neoclassical, who are of the opinion that 
ownership and control can never be dissociated. These economists have based the 
argument on the fact that shareholders, even though not participating in the running of the 
company, have all right on their shares which they can sell should they be unhappy with 
the vision and orientation adopted by management, which means that they will always 
combine both ownership and control of the company. 
With regard to this group of economists, Pitelis ( 198 7: 11) states : "Consistent with their 
focus on <consumer sovereignty>, orthodox neoclassical economists largely ignored the 
possibility of the separation of ownership from the unity of ownership and control." 
In general terms, the view expressed by the orthodox neoclassical economists, such as 
Solow (1967), is that all shareholders are in control of the companies, as they have the 
ability to sell their shares and possibly move to another company whose policies are closer 
to their preferences, thereby ensuring that the companies they own respect always their 
requirements. 
It is, however, not self-evident that shareholders will simply sell their shares and move to 
another company should they be unhappy with management, as there are many reasons 
which can stop them from doing so. These reasons include, inter alia, transaction costs, 
tax disadvantages as well as the uncertainty and volatility of the shares markets, which can 
generate substantial shareholders' costs if shares are sold when the market is low. 
Rejecting the possibility of separation between ownership and control, some have 
furthermore supported that managers will never diverge from the profit maximisation 
objective which is also the objective of shareholders as the stock market can put a low 
valuation to the company's assets, thereby tempting another management to take-over. 
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But how can one be able to establish whether higher executive salaries and other 
incentives schemes are implemented with a view to attracting and retaining excellent 
managers, who in tum will strive for profit maximisation ? Is it possible to establish 
whether a particular management team is trying to keep shareholders satisfied while 
pursuing other goals ? All these questions have not been clearly answered by those who 
have so far tackled the problem. 
Besides the above discussions, a further issue which has been widely debated under the 
ownership and control literature to emphasise shareholders' primacy is the Agency 
relationship, defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976:305-360) as being: "A contract under 
which one or more people (the principals) hire another person (the agent) to perform some· 
service on their behalf, and delegate some decision-making authority to the agent." 
The aspect of the agency relationship which is deemed relevant to this study concerns the 
relationship between shareholders and managers of management-controlled companies. 
In terms of this relationship, various mechanisms which can be used by shareholders to 
force managers to act in their best interests have been identified. These include, inter alia, 
the threat of firing and takeover. 
In their analysis of the threat of firing situation, Brigham and Gapenski (1990:11) support 
that the institutional money managers currently have the clout, if they choose to use it, to 
exercise considerable influence over a company's operations, as stock ownership is being 
increasingly concentrated in the hands oflarge institutions rather than individuals. In their 
view, the probability of a large company's management being ousted by its shareholders 
was so remote in the past that it posed little threat. This could be ascribed to the fact 
ownership of most large companies was so widely distributed, and management's control 
over the proxy mechanism was so strong, that it was almost impossible for dissident 
shareholders to gain enough votes to overthrow the managers, 
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Although Brigham and Gapenski assume in these circumstances that shareholders are able 
to force managers to respect their preferences, one can still question the correctness of 
this statement, as institutional money managers referred to are just representatives of the 
investing institutions and cannot be considered as the ultimate shareholders. It should be 
noted that in the case of pension funds, for example, the ultimate shareholders who are 
usually wage earners do not have knowledge of the ownership claims on the shares bought 
by their funds. 
Another writer who has paradoxically claimed that ownership and control cannot be 
separated is Burnham whose theory has been based on the premise that managers have 
become the ruling class combining both ownership and control. 
In this regard, Burnham (1962:91) states: "If there is no control, there is no ownership ... 
If ownership and control are in reality separated, then ownership has changed hands to the 
control and the separated ownership is a meaningless fiction." 
Burnham' s theory has been heavily criticised by numerous economists, with some pointing 
out that the author has suffered from a trained incapacity to dissociate the concept of 
control from that of ownership'. 
Contrary to non-supporting theories, the implication ofthis study is that ownership and 
control can be separated, which can lead to companies being classified either as owner-
controlled or management-controlled. 
1 This view has been expressed by Nichols (1969:35) who, in addition, has labeled 
Burnham' s theory nonsensical. 
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2.3 SUPPORTING THEORIES 
2.3.1 OWNERSHIP-CONTROL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Although all the theories reviewed under this section support that ownership and control 
are combined in the owner-controlled companies and dissociated in the management-
controlled ones, their conclusions with regard to the impact the separation of these two 
concepts has on the financial performance are not identical_ 
Considering that managers of all types of companies, owner-controlled or management-
controlled, are operating in a competitive environment, it is generally assumed that they 
will be forced to undertake actions that are reasonably consistent with the maximisation of 
the wealth of shareholders_ This reasoning is the one given by those economists who are 
of the opinion that companies's shareholding structure cannot affect their financial 
performance, as both propertied and non-propertied managers have similar goals and 
objectives in respect of growth, profit maximisation as well as their own satisfaction. 
In this regard, Nichols (1969:149-150) states: "We accept that the non-propertied 
director may derive satisfaction from increasing his company's share of the market and 
from pursuing various forms of growth policy which are not necessarily tantamount to 
maximisation of the shareholder interest, but we suspect that similar managerial policies 
might also be pursued by modern propertied directors." 
It is deemed important to mention that Nichols has remained sceptical about the extent to 
which a difference can exist between the profit utilisation policies of modem owner -
controlled and management-controlled companies and has supported that all managers or 
executive directors would have an element of moral concern for the interests of the 
shareholders. 
-19-
The above theory is rejected by economists such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) who have 
argued that the separation of ownership and control leads to financial objectives and 
strategies developed by the owner-managers being dissimilar from those adopted by non-
owner managers, which consequently results in the difference in financial performance 
between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies. 
In the management-controlled companies, for example, due to managers not having the 
same relationship to the private property as owner-managers, it is ipso facto supported 
that there is a significant difference in the nature of the profit goal and the degree of 
responsibility with which economic power is exercised. 
It is not surprising to emphasise that amongst the writers who have expressed the view 
that the separation of ownership and control does affect the financial performance of 
companies, various contradictions have also been identified. 
These contradictions are mainly prevalent in the area dealing with the managerial attitude 
towards business risks as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of their decisions in 
running their companies. The examples of contradicting theories related to the risk-taking 
attitude as mentioned in chapter one is worthy of note, with Monsen and Downs 
(1965:225) and Baumol (1967: 102) supporting that managers of management-controlled 
companies are more risk adverse than those of owner-controlled companies, whereas 
Palmer (1973b:228) and Stano (1976:677), are of the view that managers of companies 
with a diffused ownership will be willing to take more risks than those of owner-controlled 
companies. 
Furthermore, while certain have tried to demonstrate that management-controlled 
companies are less profitable than the owner-controlled ones, others have hypothesised the 
opposite and have strongly supported that profitability of management-controlled 
companies is better than that of owner-controlled companies. 
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Supporting Monsen and Downs' theories and assuming that management-controlled 
companies are less profitable than the owner-controlled ones, Shelton (1967), using the 
'x-efficiency' factor ofLeibenstein (1966), found that owner-managers were more 
productive than non-owners. 
In addition to Shelton's findings, Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) broadly theorised that the 
managers of a non-owner controlled company might pursue goals other than that of the 
maximisation shareholders' wealth (long-run profits). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) who have expressed the same view have been more specific 
than their predecessors and have justified their position by assuming that managers of the 
management-controlled companies would likely divert a certain level of returns of the 
company to such items as air conditioning, carpets and other non-pecuniary benefits for 
themselves. 
In the light of the above, it is clear that the majority of arguments held against 
management-controlled companies lie on the so called risk of mismanagement, perceived 
as the result of managers of these companies being responsible of other people's funds 
than of their own, which means that they cannot manage them more effectively and 
efficiently than the owners. 
However, that owner-controlled companies are more profitable than management-
controlled companies has not been so far proven to be true using a consistent scientific or 
bias-free statistical methodology. It is deemed unwise to support that the profit rate of 
management-controlled companies is lower than that of owner-controlled companies 
based on groundless statements, such as the one given by Jensen and Meckling. 
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How can one prove that only managers of management-controlled companies can spend 
money on items, such as air-conditioning, carpets and pecuniary benefits for themselves ? 
On the opposite side, other economists have tried to demonstrate that the risk of spending 
company's funds on luxurious items is more prevalent in the owner-controlled companies 
than it is in the management-controlled ones, as propertied-managers are perceived as 
those who will do whatever they can to improve their own welfare. 
According to Brigham and Gapenski (1990:9), for example, if a company is a 
proprietorship managed by the owner, it can be assumed that the owner-manager will take 
every possible action to improve his own welfare, with welfare measured primarily in the 
form of increased personal wealth and more leisure or perquisites, such as luxurious 
offices, expense accounts, the use of corporate planes and yachts, and personal assistants. 
It is believed that potential risk of mismanagement which could be associated with the 
management-controlled companies has been nowadays adequately controlled by a general 
public scrutiny, including good corporate governance regulations, corporate conscience as 
well as a public consensus. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that non-propertied managers are in general more qualified 
and more competent than the propertied managers who owe their positions to their 
ownership rather than anything else, it can be assumed the companies they run 
(management-controlled companies) will always have better financial performance than 
those controlled/managed by their owners. 
This view is the one supported by Dahrendorfwhose managerial theory, as summarised by 
Nichols (1969:42), stipulates: "A new class of managers had emerged to replace the old 
owner-managers. These managers are bureaucrats who owe their position to their 
managerial ability instead of property ownership." 
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The different social background, training, and experience of the non-propertied managers 
are considered as the factors which make them both think and act differently from their 
predecessors (the owner-managers or capitalists). 
Logically, it can be expected that non-owner managers who are in possession of the 
required skills, expertise and qualifications should conduct their companies more, not less 
profitably than the owner-managers who, in the majority of instances, owe their positions 
to their ownership. 
2.3.2 OWNERSHIP-CONTROL AND DIVIDEND PAYMENT 
Similarly to the situation described in the section above, review of the existing literature 
related to the separation of ownership and control and dividend payment has revealed the 
existence of contradicting opinions as far as the retention of earnings for re-investment and 
payment of dividends to shareholders are concerned. 
For example, when on the one hand the view expressed by Marglin (1975) is that 
managers of management-controlled companies favour low dividends, with Hilferding 
(1981) claiming from his side that owner-managers will always prefer high retention ratios, 
Nichols ( 1969), on the other hand, has been of the opinion that the preference for dividend 
distribution is not fully served by either management- or owner-controlled companies. 
Supplementary to Marglin's argumentation, Pitelis (1987) has sought to attribute the 
preference for a low dividend and high retention by non-owner managers to the fact that 
plough-back, on top of eliminating the risks associated with external borrowing, does not 
have any restrictive impact on their consumption. 
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In this regard, Pitelis (1987:32) states: "As managers are assumed not to own shares, they 
are not required to consume less when there is an increase in the retention ratio ... It 
follows that non-owner managers prefer higher retention ratio to that favoured by 
shareholders." 
With regard to the view expressed by Hilferding (1981), it is deemed important to mention 
that his theory has been found to be akin to the Marxist tradition, which claims that 
owner-controlled companies will always pay lower dividends than management-controlled 
companies, as owner-managers who are capitalists have to deal carefully with the 
competition that exists between them and financial capitalists. 
It is evident that borrowing from financial institutions is often associated with the risk of 
industrial capitalists losing their control to financiers. For this reason, the retention of 
earnings can be considered safer and more desirable for industrial capitalists than external 
borrowing. Quite obviously, non-owner managers do not have the same risk. 
The Marxist theory in respect of capital accumulation as presented by Pitelis (1987:44) 
stipulates : "A capitalist who fails to compete in the above framework (with their workers 
and with their fellow capitalists) is sooner or later a non-capitalist. The survival of those 
left depends upon their ability to compete successfully. In the above sense competition 
ensures that capitalists will tend to accumulate." 
The above argumentation also applies to the issuing of new equity which might result in 
owner-managers losing their control on the companies they own in majority and manage. 
In fact, it is evident that a decision by the owner-managers to pay a low dividend and 
retain a large proportion of earnings for re-investment will have a smaller-scale impact 
when compared to management-controlled companies in which the majority of shares are 
directly or indirectly owned by outside investors. 
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As mentioned by Brigham and Gapenski (1990), many shareholders rely on dividends to 
meet their expenses and will be inconvenienced should the dividend stream be unstable. 
Moreover, due to the fact that a reduction of dividends to make funds available for 
investment can send incorrect signals and drive down the share price, it is preferable for a 
company wishing to maximise its share price to balance its internal needs for funds against 
the needs of its shareholders. 
To support their position in respect of shareholders' preference for dividend and to stress 
the impact a dividend payment has on the share price, Brigham and Gapenski (1990:428) 
state: "It has been observed that an increase in the dividend is often accompanied by an 
increase in the share price, while a dividend cut generally leads to a share price decline. 
This could suggest that investors, in the aggregate, prefer dividends than capital gains." 
Apart from all the above theories, further disagreements have been noted in respect of 
dividend policy, with the main conflicting arguments being elaborated by Modigliani and 
Miller (1961}, Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1962} and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979) as explained below. 
According to Modigliani and Miller, no optimal dividend policy exists, with one policy 
being as good as any other. This theory has been based on the premise that dividend policy 
does not affect the value of the company or its cost of capital; reason why it has been 
considered irrelevant. This position was theoretically proven under unrealistic conditions, 
assuming that personal and corporate income taxes as well as transaction and flotation 
costs do not exist; that dividend policy does not have an impact on the company's cost of 
equity and capital investment policy; and that investors and managers have the same set of 
information regarding future investment opportunities. Considering that the above 
assumptions do not hold precisely, the validity of the conclusions reached by Modigliani 
and Miller has been found to be questionable. 
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Contrary to the dividend irrelevance theory, Gordon and Lintner have argued that 
dividends are less risky than capital gains and that, in order to maximise its value, a 
company should set a high dividend ratio and offer a high dividend yield. Their view is that 
the cost of equity increases as the dividend pay-out is reduced, as investors are more sure 
of receiving dividend payments than the income from capital gains. This theory has been 
rejected by Modigliani and Miller, calling it "the bird-in-the-hand fallacy''. 
A further rejection of the theory formulated by Gordon and Lintner came from 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy who have supported that investors should require higher 
rates of return on stocks with high dividend yields, since dividends are effectively taxed at 
higher rates than capital gains. According to them, a company should pay a low or no 
dividend in order to maximise its value. 
Form the above, it is deemed important to note that dividend policy decisions cannot be 
based on precise mathematical models but should indeed be linked to the shareholders' 
needs for current income as well as the needs for future growth. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
From the review of existing literature in respect of the separation of ownership and control 
as well as the financial performance of owner-controlled and management-controlled 
companies, a variety of contradictions, inconsistencies, including inconclusive assumptions 
have been highlighted. 
A number of theories rejecting the possibility of a separation of ownership and control 
have been examined, with the basis of their argumentation being also scrutinised. 
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Although several economists, as demonstrated in this chapter, have supported that 
ownership and control are separated in the management-controlled companies, their 
opinions with regard to the financial performance of this type of companies compared to 
that of the owner-controlled ones, including the policy in respect of the retention of 
earnings for re-investment and dividend payments, are found to be contradictory. 
In the light of this review, it is evident that theories and literature related to the impact the 
separation of ownership and control has on the financial performance of different types of 
companies are in state of unclearness and ambiguity. 
The implications of this study are that ownership and control are separated in the 
management-controlled companies and combined in the owner-controlled ones and that 
the use of an appropriate analytical tool can help determine how the financial performance 
is affected by the combination or the separation of these two concepts. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRQDUCTION 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, existing theoretical and empirical studies have 
failed to provide consistent and clear answers to the questions related to the separation of 
ownership and control and its impact on the financial performance of owner-controlled 
and management-controlled companies. This research is expected to provide the necessary 
clarifications in this area as far as South African listed companies are concerned. 
While it is evident that part of an adequate data analysis is to understand the assumptions 
underlying each of the hypothesis-testing techniques and to select the best suited for a 
given set of conditions, other criteria for test selection include the simplicity of the 
procedure, the ability to generalise the conclusions to be drawn up, the availability of 
computer software packages that can facilitate test procedure, the accessibility of tables 
reflecting the critical values for the test statistic as well as the statistical power of the 
procedure itself. 
In order to successfully test the hypotheses formulated in section 1. 5 (chapter I) of this 
study, various statistical techniques and procedures have been evaluated, with a view to 
determining the most appropriate, aimed at ensuring the validity of conclusions to be 
generated during the examination of differences in financial performance between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies. 
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This chapter covers the methodology applied in the research. It describes the population 
under scrutiny, explains the sources and types of data to be analysed, the adopted 
sampling strategies as well as the data processing and analysis techniques, including 
hypotheses testing. 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE POPULATION 
The population covered by this study consists of South African companies listed on the 
industrial sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In this research, the population will 
be divided into categories, with the first (population 1) being constituted by the owner-
controlled companies and the second (population 2) by the management-controlled ones. 
The selection of industrial companies is motivated by the availability of the research data 
which have been found to be fully reflected in their published financial statements and 
various other reports. 
It is deemed important to mention that the financial and mining sectors have been excluded 
due to their inability to comply with the study requirements, either by the absence of the 
necessary information in respect of the financial aspects being analysed or by the fact that 
they are dominated by management-controlled companies. 
3.3 SOURCES AND IYPES OF DATA 
Data used in this analytical study have been obtained from the Listing Division of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the JSE Handbooks (from 1988 to 1996) published by 
Flesh Financial Publications as well as the Investors' Guides issued by the Investors' 
Group during the same period. In certain instances, recourse has been made to individual 
company annual reports. 
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All these sources have been simultaneously utilised in order to ensure the accuracy, 
validity and completeness of data to be processed and analysed. 
It should be noted that data received from the above mentioned sources are considered as 
raw data, used to compute the required financial ratios which in tum are processed with a 
view to obtaining the analysable statistical parameters (variables) for both owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies during the period under evaluation. 
These research variables exist in the form of numerical data and should be interpreted by 
means of appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures. 
3.4 SAMPLING STRATEGIES 
This research is an analytical and comparative study using two samples. While the first 
sample represents the owner-controlled companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange from 1989 to 1995 (the research period), the second comprises the 
management-controlled companies which were similarly listed during the same period. 
The two samples have been randomly selected from the two categories of companies, via a 
research database, which has been established and treated with a view to eliminating the 
risk of potential biases in the results, thereby ensuring the validity of conclusions to be 
generated, as explained in the following subsection. 
It should be noted that the need for a research database is justified by the requirement in 
terms of which companies to be analysed must have operated as listed companies 
throughout the research period. This requirement has been dictated on the one hand by 
data availability and on the other by the need to ensure the accuracy, validity and 
completeness of processing. In this study, the research database is established using a 
modern mathematical approach. 
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3.4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESEARCH DATABASE 
Based on data obtained from the industrial sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
and using a modern mathematical approach, as illustrated below, two sets of elements (set 
A and set B) have been constituted and captured on the computer system, using COREL 
QUATTRO PRO 7, in order to establish the research database_ 
The elements contained in set A are all the industrial companies which were listed as at the 
beginning of the first year of the research period (1989). These companies are represented 
in the illustration as elements a, b, c, d, e and f 
With regard to set B, the constituting elements are all the industrial companies which were 
listed as at the end of the last year of the research period (1995)_ These companies are 
represented as elements d, e, f, g, h and i. 
Mathematically stated, the two sets are as follows : 
Set A= {a, b, c, d, e, f} and 
Set B = {d, e, f, g, h, i}. 
Due to the fact that the study covers only companies which at least have operated as listed 
companies from 1989 to 1995, the modern mathematical procedure used to create the 
research database is "the intersection" between the two sets of elements. 
This intersection consists of elements (companies) which have been found in both set A 
and set B, as illustrated in Figure 3 .1. 
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Figure 3.1 : Intersection between set A and set B. 
Writing about set operations, Neter, Wasserman and Whitmore (1982:708) give the 
following definition : "For any pair of sets A and B, An B denotes the set of all elements 
that belong to both A and B, and is called their set intersection." 
In this illustration, the intersection between set A and set B can mathematically be 
presented as follows : 
A n B = ( d, e, f) 
The fact that a, b and c are not included in the intersection, as a result of their absence 
from set B, means that these elements (a, band c) represent companies which were 
delisted during the period. Using the same logic, the absence of elements g, h an i in set A 
and consequently in the intersection reveals that the elements g, h and i represent 
companies which were not listed as at the beginning of the research period. 
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In the light of the above, it is obvious that elements d, e and f which are in both set A and 
set B and are therefore included in the intersection represent companies which have 
operated as listed companies throughout the study period and constitute the research 
database. 
3.4.2 CLEANSING AND DISCARDING OF ANOMALIES 
Taking into account the GIGO principle (garbage in, garbage out), it is deemed important 
to review all the data pertaining to companies included in the research database in order to 
eliminate those found to be incomplete, inappropriate or unrelated to the study. 
Cleansing and discarding of anomalies form an important phase in the research process, as 
they clear the ground for a smooth organisation and presentation of data, thereby 
facilitating effective processing and analysis. 
In terms of this study requirements, the following companies have been discarded from the 
research database : 
companies which operate abroad but have been listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange; 
companies with Headquarters outside South Africa; 
companies for which information in respect of shareholding is missing or is not 
clearly reflected; 
companies which changed from one type to another during the study period (i.e. 
from owner-controlled to management-controlled and vice-versa); 
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companies for which the necessary financial data are missing; and 
companies with financial data in currency other than the South African Rand. 
3.4.3 CLASSIFICATION OF COMPANIES 
Subsequent to the cleansing and discarding of anomalies, information related to the 
shareholding for the remaining companies has been meticulously scrutinised year-by-year 
throughout the research period to facilitate company categorisation, as follows : 
Where Managers/Executives have kept more than 50 % shareholding from 1989 to 1995, 
companies have been classified as "owner-controlled". On the other hand, companies 
owned by pension funds, insurance companies or other large companies and in which 
Managers/Executives are not shareholders have been termed "management-controlled". 
From this classification, only two categories of companies emerge; the first comprising the 
owner-controlled companies and the second the management-controlled ones. 
3.4.4 SAMPLES SELECTION AND MATCHING 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 reflect respectively the list of owner-controlled and management-
controlled companies constituting the two random samples analysed in this study and 
which have been matched according the standard industrial classification (SIC). 
The first sample, called Group A, has been randomly selected from the category formed 
by owner-controlled companies. Similarly, the constitution of the second sample, called 
Group B, has been also based on a random selection performed on management-controlled 
companies, with the standard industrial classification being used to match companies 
extracted from this group with those included in the first sample. 
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The matching of the two samples is found to be a compulsory requirement, as it facilitates 
an adequate and effective control over inter-industry variances, thereby ensuring the 
accuracy and validity of the analysis. 
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COMPANY CREATION YEAR LISTING YEAR MINIMUM% OF SHARES 
HELD BY MANAGEMENT 
ARIES PACKAGING 1981 1987 60 
STOCKS & STOCKS HOLDINGS 1945 1988 72 
GENERAL OPTICAL 1924 1951 66 
COMBINED MOTOR 1965 1987 68 
SONDOR INDUSTRIES 1948 1987 53 
SCHARRGHUISEN 1969 1987 66 
TITACO/BATEMAN PROJECTS 1982 1987 52 
CLYDE INDUSTRIAL 1919 1987 90 
BRENNER MILLS 1987 1987 80 
GLOD INA 1986 1987 70 
NINIAN AND LESTER 1936 1969 53 
PALS HOLDINGS 1937 1987 58 
ADVANCED TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 1975 1987 54 
AROMA 1987 1987 75 
ARTHUR KAPLAN 1973 1987 69 
PICK'NPAY STORES 1968 1969 52 
MICOR INDUSTRIAL 1955 1987 59 
NICTUS 1964 1969 72 
BOLTON INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS 1886 1947 63 
CARGO CARRIERS 1959 1987 76 
TIGER WHEELS HOLDINGS 1967 1987 61 
Table 3 .1 : Owner-controlled companies (Group A). 
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COMPANY CREATION YEAR LISTING YEAR PRINCIPAL SHAREHOLDERS 
COATES BROTHERS 1936 1967 COATES 
LTA 1889 1965 AMIC 
ADCOCK 1890 1949 TIGER OATS 
TOYOTA 1961 1964 WESCO & TOYOTA 
CHUBB HOLDINGS 1950 1973 CHUBB 
HAGGIE 1950 1979 AMIC & MALBAK 
METKOR 1968 1969 IND. AND MINING INVESTMENT 
AFRICAN OXYGEN 1927 1964 BOC HOLDINGS 
OCEANA FISHING 1918 1947 CG SMITH 
STERLING CLOTHING 1932 1988 SA EAGLE 
CONSHU HOLDINGS 1968 1987 SAB 
ROMA TEX 1920 1944 CG SMITH 
REUNERT 1888 1948 BARLOW 
CLICKS GROUP 1968 1979 SCORE CLICKS HOLDINGS 
WOOLTRU 1936 1936 SA MUTUAL 
EDGARS 1946 1946 SAB 
MURRAY & ROBERTS HOLDINGS 1948 1968 SANKO RP 
PLATE GLASS 1897 1947 PLACOR 
IMPERIAL HOLDINGS 1946 1989 SA MUTUAL 
UNI TRANS 1962 1987 SANKO RP 
MET AIR 1948 1949 WESCO 
Table 3.2: Management-controlled companies (Group B). 
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3.5 METHODS OF DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
Data obtained directly from the various sources mentioned in section 3 .3 ofthis chapter 
are of a such unprepared nature that they cannot meaningfully be used in this type of 
research. Therefore, they require a series of preliminary treatments and organisation which 
can facilitate the computation of the appropriate research variables to be analysed. 
All the mathematical and statistical techniques utilised in the computation of the research 
variables, starting by the calculation of the required financial ratios which have been used 
to compute the necessary statistical parameters are explained below. This explanation is 
followed by the description of both the selected hypotheses-testing procedure and the 
comparative/ empirical analysis pattern. 
3.5.1 RATIOS CALCULATION 
In this study, the evaluation of the financial performance of the owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa is performed through the analysis of 
variables emanating from the selected financial ratios. 
Due to data collected not being in a ratio format, it has been deemed imperative to apply 
the appropriate financial formulas to the relevant balance sheets and income statements 
data in order to obtain all the required ratios per company and per year. 
The ratios calculation has been performed using the COREL QUATTRO PRO 7 software 
which was also used to establish the research database, to effect the cleansing and 
discarding of anomalies and to categorise selected companies. The two research samples 
together with all the relevant financial data are stored in this application. 
With all the data being already captured and stored on the system, the appropriate 
financial formulas defining the input fields for each financial ratio have been specified in 
the corresponding output field to facilitate accurate and complete processing. The output 
field name is followed by two digits which represent the corresponding financial year. 
Financial formulas used to determine the required ratios are reflected in Table 3 .3. 
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FINANCIAL ASPECT FINANCIAL RATIO OUTPUT FORMULA UTILISED 
FIELD NAME 
I .PROFIT ABILITY PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES •PRMS(yy)• (NET INCOME+ TURNOVER)*IOO 
RETURN ON TOT AL ASSETS •ROTAS(yy)• (NET INCOME + TOT AL ASSETS)* JOO 
RETURN ON EQUITY •ROEQ(yy)• (NET INCOME+ COMMON EQUITY)* JOO 
2.ASSET MANAGEMENT FIXED ASSET TURNOVER «FASTR(yy)• TURNOVER+ FIXED ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER •TASTR(yy)• TURNOVER+ TOTAL ASSETS 
3.LIQUIDITY CURRENT RATIO •CURA T(yy)• CURRENT ASSETS+ CURRENT LIABILITIES 
4.LEVERAGE TOT AL DEBT TO EQUITY «DE/EQ(yy)• (TOTAL DEBT+ EQUITY)*IOO 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS •TODAS(yy)• (TOTAL DEBT+ TOTAL ASSETS)*IOO 
LONG-TERM DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS «LTDAS(yy)• (LONG-TERM DEBT+ TOTAL ASSETS)* JOO 
5.DIVIDEND PAYMENT DIVIDEND PAY-OUT RATIO •DIVPY(yy)• DIVIDEND+ EARNING PER SHARE 
Table 3.3 : Financial ratios and their formulas. 
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3.5.2 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH VARIABLES 
In order to obtain the research variables per year and for each of the two samples 
throughout the research period, all the financial ratios calculated via COREL QUATTRO 
PRO 7, as explained in the previous subsection, have been subjected to a descriptive 
statistics treatment. 
Descriptive statistics are defined by Berenson and Levine (1998:4) as : "Those methods 
involving the collection, presentation and characterisation of a set of data in order to 
describe the various features of that set of data." 
It should be noted that these methods are used in this study to calculate a variety of 
statistical parameters/variables, including mean, median, standard error, standard deviation 
and variance. This calculation has been performed per ratio, per year and for each sample. 
Results from descriptive statistics are reflected in Annexure Al to AS. 
Subsequent to this statistical treatment, all the obtained mean values (per ratio) have been 
extracted from each sample and presented in a single table reflecting years in columns and 
samples in rows, with a view to facilitating the hypotheses-testing as well as the 
comparative/empirical analysis. 
3.5.3 HYPOTHESIS-TESTING PROCEDURE 
In statistics, various test procedures have been developed to facilitate analytical 
comparisons and to examine differences between two or more groups based on 
independent samples containing numerical data. These statistical test procedures include, 
inter alia, the Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in two medians, the Kruskal-W allis 
rank test for differences in c medians, the pooled-variance t test for differences in two 
means and the one-way ANO VA F test for differences in c means. Choosing the suitable 
test procedure is the art of good data analysis. 
Amongst the above mentioned hypotheses-testing procedures which have been evaluated 
to establish whether they can satisfy this study requirements, THE POOLED-VARIANCE 
t TEST design has been found to be the most appropriate one, as it has been noticed that 
its underlying assumptions fall in line with the research strategies. 
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In this regard, Berenson and Levine (1998:413) state: "A pooled-variance ttest can be 
used to determine whether there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
populations if the assumptions made are that the two samples are randomly and 
independently drawn from normally distributed populations and, further, that the 
population variances are equal." 
Furthermore, the pooled-variance t test procedure meets the other selection criteria 
mentioned in section 3 .1 which include the simplicity of the procedure, the ability to 
generalise the conclusions to be drawn up, the accessibility of tables reflecting the critical 
values for the test statistic and the statistical power of the procedure itself The design is 
found to be able to ensure the validity of the conclusions to be generated. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, section 1.5, the basic hypothesis of this study is that there is a 
significant difference between the financial performance of owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa, as measured in terms of profitability, 
asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment, using the relevant financial 
ratios. 
In order to confirm or reject this basic hypothesis, the null hypothesis which has to be 
statistically tested is that there is no difference in financial performance between owner -
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, as measured in terms of 
profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment, using the 
relevant financial ratios. 
The alternative hypothesis which must be confirmed should the null hypothesis be rejected 
is that there is a difference between the financial performance of owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa, as measured in terms of profitability, 
asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment, using the relevant financial 
ratios. 
Due to the fact that the selected financial ratios are surrogates for the financial 
performance of owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, 
the statistical testing has to be performed on each one of them. 
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Formally stated, the null hypothesis is : 
and the alternative hypothesis is : 
where 
µ1 =a vector of criterion-variables of owner-controlled companies; and 
µ2 = a vector of criterion-variables of management-controlled companies. 
The vector for owner-controlled and management-controlled companies consist of 
criterion-variables µijk, where 
i represents the ilh sample; 
j represents the j111 financial aspect; and 
k represents the k111 variable. 
Selected financial ratios and their statistical representations are reflected in Table 3 .4 
below. 
FINANCIAL ASPECT FINANCIAL RATIOS PARAMETER 
I .PROFIT ABILITY PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES µill 
RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS µil2 
RETURN ON EQUITY µ,13 
2.ASSET MANAGEMENT FIXED ASSET TURNOVER µi21 
TOT AL ASSET TURNOVER µi22 
3.LIQUIDITY CURRENT RATIO µill 
4.LEVERAGE TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY µi41 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS µi42 
LONG-TERM DEBT TO TOTAL µ,,, 
ASSETS 
SDIVIDEND PAYMENT DIVIDEND PAY-OUT RATIO µnl 
Table 3.4 : Financial ratios and their statistical representations. 
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Using the parameters related to the selected financial ratios as specified in Table 3.4, the 
null hypothesis (H0 : µ1 = µ2) can be represented as follows : 
Ho: (1) µ111 = µ211 (Profit margin on sales) 
(2) µ112 = µ212 (Return on total assets) 
(3) µ113 = µ213 (Return on equity) 
(4) µ121 = µ221 (Fixed asset turnover) 
(5) µ122 = µ222 (Total asset turnover) 
(6) µ131 = µ231 (Current ratio) 
(7) µ141 = µ241 (Total debt to equity) 
(8) µ142 = µ242 (Total debt to total assets) 
(9) µ143 = µ243 (Long-term debt to total assets) 
(10) µ!Sl = µ251 (Dividend pay-out ratio) 
Should the testing confirm all the above statistical equalities, then it can concluded that 
there is no difference between the financial performance of owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa, which confirms the stated null 
hypothesis (H0 : µ1 = µ,). 
Contrary to this situation, if during the testing process one of the statistical equalities is 
not confirmed, the null hypothesis (H0 : µ1 = µ,) will be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis (H1 : µ1 * µ2} accepted. In this situation, the financial aspect(s) and ratio(s) for 
which the equality is rejected will be identified as the ones being different between the two 
sets of data. 
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The significance of the difference in financial performance between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa will depend on the number of 
rejections encountered during the application of the pooled-variance t test procedure, with 
the extreme situation being when none of the statistical equalities is accepted. In other 
words, should the majority of the above statistical equalities be rejected (at least six out of 
ten), it can be concluded that the difference is significant. 
Formally stated, the alternative hypothesis (H1 : µ1 "' µ2) in its extreme situation can be 
represented as follows : 
H1 : (1) µ111 "' µ211 (Profit margin on sales) 
(2) µ112 "' µ212 (Return on total assets) 
(3) µ113 "' µ213 (Return on equity) 
(4) µ121 "' µ221 (Fixed asset turnover) 
(5) µ122 "' µ222 (Total asset turnover) 
(6) µ131 "' µ231 (Current ratio) 
(7) µ141 "' µ241 (Total debt to equity) 
(8) µ142 "' µ242 (Total debt to total assets) 
(9) µ143 "' µ243 (Long-term debt to total assets) 
(10) µ151 "' µ251 (Dividend pay-out ratio) 
In order to accept or reject the research null hypothesis (H0: µ1 = µ,), the pooled-variance 
t test procedure will be performed on all the research variables (financial ratios). 
Should the null hypothesis be rejected during any testing, then the alternative hypothesis 
(H1 : µ1 * µ2) will be confirmed, with the significance of the difference depending on the 
number of rejections, as mentioned above. 
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The pooled-variance t test statistic used in this study can be computed using the following 
equation: 
Where 
and 
s2 = p 
(n1 - l)S12 + (n2 - l)S; 
(n1 - 1) + (n2 - 1) 
s; =pooled variance 
x1 =mean of the sample taken from owner-controlled companies 
µ1 = mean of the population constituted by owner-controlled companies 
S1
2 
= variance of the sample taken from owner-controlled companies 
n1 =size of the sample taken from owner-controlled companies 
x2 =mean of the sample taken from management-controlled companies 
µ2 =mean of the population constituted by management-controlled 
companies 
s; =variance of the sample taken from management-controlled companies 
n2 =size of the sample taken from management-controlled companies 
(x1 - x,) =test statistic (i.e., the difference between two sample means) 
(µ 1 - µ2 ) = difference between two population means = 0 under H0 
1 
+ -) 
= estimated standard error of the test statistic 
nz 
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The summarised fonnat of the testing equation as mentioned above is stated below : 
Sample Statistic - Hypothesised Population Parameter 
Standard Error of the Statistic 
Considering the primary objective of the study, the pooled-variance t test procedure, 
following a t distribution with n1 + n2 - 2 degree of freedom, will be conducted in its two-
tailed fonnat at the a = . 05 level of significance. 
With this procedure, the null hypothesis related to each research variable is rejected and 
the alternative confinned ifthe computed t-test statistic exceeds the upper-tailed critical 
value tn
1 
+n,- 2 from the t distribution or ifthe computed test statistic is below the lower-
tailed critical value - t 2 from the t distribution. This being the case, the decision rule n1 +n2 -
can be fonnulated as follows : 
Reject the null hypothesis H 0 if t > t _2 n1 +n2 
or ift <-t 2 ; n1 +n2-
otherwise do not reject H0. 
The decision rule and regions of rejection are displayed in Figure 3.2. 
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Do not 
reject H0 
µ, = µ2 
I 
J 
I 
0 
Figure 3.2 : Decision rule and rejection regions for the two-tailed t test. 
3.6 CONCWSION 
It is expected that the application of this research methodology including the selected 
hypotheses testing procedure will not only lead to establishing whether there is a 
significant difference in financial performance of owner-controlled and management-
controlled companies in South Africa but also facilitate the analysis of the main aspects of 
the difference, should it exist. 
Appropriate mathematical and statistical techniques have been used to ensure the 
accuracy, validity and completeness of data collection, processing and analysis. 
The randomly selected samples representing the owner-controlled and management-
controlled companies have been adequately matched, with the period covered by the study 
and the socioeconomic environment being kept exactly identical in order to avoid the risk 
of a distorted analysis. 
-47-
CHAPTER4 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A primary examination of the research data has been conducted by applying a 
descriptive statistics treatment to individual financial ratios with a view to obtaining 
statistical parameters such as mean, median, standard error, standard deviation and 
variance per sample and per year throughout the research period. 
Subsequently, the hypothesis-testing as well as the comparative analysis of the two 
sample representing owner-controlled companies (Group A) and management-controlled 
companies (Group B), have been performed using the mean values emanating from the 
initial treatment as mentioned above. Each financial ratio has been distinctively tested 
and analysed. 
It should be remembered that the hypothesis-testing has been performed using the 
pooled-variance t test procedure as explained in the previous chapter. Graphical 
illustrations have also been utilised to facilitate a straightforward comparison. 
4.2 HYPOTHESIS-TESTING AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.2.1 PROFITABILITY 
Profitability ratios are of a particular interest to management, investors and lenders, as 
the profit generated by a company is needed to provide a return to investors and to 
finance future growth. A sign of sound financial health and how effectively the company 
is managed lies in its ability to generate a satisfactory profit and return on investment. 
Key ratios of operating performance analysed under this subsection are profit margin on 
sales, return on total assets and return on equity. 
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4.2.1.1 PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
This ratio is an important parameter of operating activity, as it calculates profitability 
obtained from revenues, thereby providing an indication of the company's pricing, cost 
structure and control as well as production efficiency . 
4.2.1.1.1 Presentation of data 
Data related to the profit margin on sales (in%) are reflected in Table 4.1 below. 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
5.16 
5.89 
1990 
5.02 
5.19 
1991 
3.90 
4.99 
1992 
3.19 
4.68 
Table 4.1 : Profit margin on sales data. 
4.2.1.1.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1993 
3.34 
5.09 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
Ho: (1) 
1994 
4.54 
5.36 
This means that there is no difference in "profit margin on sales" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
The alternative to be confirmed should the above be rejected is as follows : 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "profit margin on sales" between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
1995 
4.32 
5.76 
Applying the pooled-variance t test procedure to data in Table 4.1, at the a= .05 level 
of significance, a set of statistical results are obtained and displayed in Table 4.2. 
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Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
elf 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Group A) Variable l (Group B) 
4.2096 5.2794 
0.5944 0.1818 
7.0000 7.0000 
0.3881 
0.0000 
12.0000 
-3.2128 
0.0075 
2.1788 
Table 4.2 : Statistical results on "profit margin on sales" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.2 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = - 3 .2128 < - t12 = - 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (1) µ111 = µ211 of no difference 
in "profit margin on sales" is rejected, with the alternative H1 : (I) µ111 * µ211, stating 
that there is a difference being confirmed. 
4.2.1.1.3 Comparative analysis 
Figure 4.1 below depicts a straightforward comparison between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled data contained in Table 4.1. This comparison reveals that the 
profit margin on sales of owner-controlled companies has been below that of 
management-controlled companies throughout the entire research period. It is therefore 
evident that for each rand of sales, management-controlled companies have realised a 
better profit than their owner-controlled counterparts, which could be ascribed to a 
more effective cost structure and/or production efficiency. 
During the period under review, the highest level of profit margin on sales for both 
groups was achieved in 1989. In that year, the ratio reached 5. 89 and 5 .16 for 
management-controlled and owner-controlled companies respectively. At the other end, 
the lowest level for both groups was seen in 1992, when the ratio declined to 4. 68 for 
the management-controlled companies and to 3 .19 for the owner-controlled ones. 
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The upward trend which started after 1992 for both groups could not be effectively 
maintained by owner-controlled companies, as their profit margin on sales, after 
reaching 4.54 in 1994, dropped to 4.32 in 1995. 
As mentioned above, a straightforward comparison is depicted in Figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 : Profit margin on sales. 
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4.2.1.2 RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS 
The effective use of assets can be measured by computing the return on total assets. This 
ratio measures management's ability and efficiency in using the company's assets to 
generate profits. 
4.2.1.2.1 Presentation of data 
Table 4.3 below reflects data pertaining to the return on total assets (in%). 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
8.98 
10.51 
4.2.1.2.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1990 
7.86 
9.11 
1991 
6.19 
8.72 
1992 
4.93 
7.81 
Table 4.3 : Return on total assets data. 
1993 
5.61 
8.25 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (2) 
1994 
7.76 
8.69 
This means that there is no difference in "return on total assets" between owner -
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
H,: (2) 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "return on total assets" between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
1995 
7.86 
9.51 
The application of the pooled-variance t test on data in Table 4.3 , at the ex= .05 level of 
significance, generates a set of statistical results as displayed in Table 4.4. 
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Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
elf 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable I (Group A) 
7.0281 
2.1410 
7.0000 
1.4586 
0.0000 
12.0000 
-2.9658 
0.0118 
2.1788 
Variable 2 (Group B) 
8.9427 
0.7761 
7.0000 
Table 4 .4 : Statistical results on "return on total assets" testing_ 
From the results reflected in Table 4.4 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
Ast= - 2.9658 < - t12 = - 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (2) µ112 = µ212 of no difference 
in "return on total assets" is rejected, with the alternative H1 : (2) µ112 * µ21,, stating that 
there is a difference accepted. 
4.2.1.2.3 Comparative analysis 
Similarly to the profit margin on sales, the return on total assets of owner-controlled 
companies has been lower than that of their management-controlled counterparts 
throughout the entire research period. This means that management-controlled 
companies have been more efficient than owner-controlled companies in the employment 
ofresources to obtain the net income. 
The highest return on total assets was achieved by both groups in 1989, with the ratio 
reaching 10.51 and 8.98 for management-controlled and owner-controlled companies 
respectively. As for the profit margin on sales, the lowest level for both groups was seen 
in 1992 when the owner-controlled companies realised 4.93 and the management-
controlled companies 7. 81. 
After 1992, the upward trend started and was maintained by both owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies until 1995. 
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A direct comparison is depicted in Figure 4 .2 below. 
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Figure 4 .2 : Return on total assets. 
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4.2.1.3 RETURN ON EQUITY 
The return on equity calculates the return the common shareholders are receiving on 
their original investment plus subsequent earnings retained in the company. This key 
financial ratio is the most effective measure of how management is performing for the 
owners. 
4.2.1.3.1 Presentation of data 
Table 4.5 below reflects data pertaining to the return on equity (in%). 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
18.72 
23.42 
4.2.1.3.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
16.65 13.88 10.39 11.90 
20.69 19.55 17.44 17.64 
Table 4.5 : Return on equity data. 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (3) 
1994 1995 
16.48 17.80 
18.81 19.70 
This means that there is no difference in "return on equity" between owner-controlled 
and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
H 1 : (3) 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "return on equity" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
In applying the pooled-variance t test on data reflected in Table 4.5 , at the a= .05 level 
of significance, a set of statistical results are obtained and displayed in Table 4.6. 
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Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
elf 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Group A) 
15.1163 
9.7532 
7.0000 
6.9502 
0.0000 
12.0000 
-3.1866 
0.0078 
2.1788 
Variable 2 (Group B) 
19.6067 
4.1472 
7.0000 
Table 4.6 : Statistical results on "return on equity" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.6 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = - 3 .1866 < - t12 = - 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (3) µ113 = µ213 of no difference 
in "return on equity" is rejected, with the alternative H1 : (3) µ113 ~ µ213, stating that 
there is a difference being accepted. 
4.2.1.3.3 Comparative analysis 
The situation in respect of the return on equity is not different from the one regarding 
the return on total assets. Scrutiny of related data reveals that the return on equity of 
owner-controlled companies has been lower than that of their management-controlled 
counterparts during the seven years under review. 
In terms of the above, it is deemed important to stress that shareholders ofmanagement-
controlled companies have been realising a higher return on their investment than those 
of owner-controlled companies during the entire period covered by the study. 
It should also be noted that for both groups, the highest return on equity was achieved in 
1989, when the ratio reached 23.42 for management-controlled companies and 18.72 for 
the owner-controlled ones. 
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Similarly to the other two profitability ratios analysed above (the profit margin on sales 
and the return on total assets), the return on equity dropped to its lowest level in 1992. 
In that year the owner-controlled companies achieved 10.39 and the management-
controlled companies 17.44. 
After 1992, the upward trend started for both groups and was maintained until 1995. 
Figure 4.3 simplifies a comparison between the groups. 
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Figure 4.3 : Return on equity. 
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4.2.2 ASSET MANAGEMENT 
The asset management ratios evaluate how efficiently a company' s assets are utilised to 
generate sales. The two ratios analysed under this financial aspect are fixed asset 
turnover and total asset turnover. 
4.2.2.1 FIXED ASSET TURNOVER 
The fixed asset turnover ratio measures the efficiency with which a company fixed assets 
are used to generate sales. A low fixed asset turnover ratio, when compared to other 
companies in the industry, may indicate that a company possesses too much investment 
in fixed assets relative to sales. It should, however, be noted that the fixed asset turnover 
ratio can be positively affected in instances where a company leases more fixed assets 
than it buys or keeps old and/or fully depreciated fixed assets. 
4.2.2.1.1 Presentation of data 
Table 4.7 below reflects data related to the fixed asset turnover ratio. 
K:JROUP A 
KiROUPB 
1989 
21.64 
7.28 
4.2.2.1.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1990 
10.87 
6.27 
1991 
10.05 
6 .17 
1992 
11.34 
5.98 
Table 4.7 : Fixed asset turnover data. 
1993 
13 .04 
5.87 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (4) 
1994 
13.84 
5.86 
This means that there is no difference in "fixed asset turnover'' between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Afiica. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
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1995 
17.05 
6.32 
This alternative means that there is a difference in " fixed asset turnover'' between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Applying the pooled-variance t test on data contained in Table 4.7 , at the a = .05 level 
of significance, a set of statistical results are obtained and reflected in Table 4.8. 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable I (Group A) 
13.9773 
16.8501 
7.0000 
8.5450 
0.0000 
12.0000 
4.9449 
0.0003 
2.1788 
Variable 2 (Group BJ 
6.2509 
0.2400 
7.0000 
Table 4.8 : Statistical results on "fixed asset turnover" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4 .8 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are + 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = 4.9449 > t12 = 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : ( 4) µ 121 = µ221 of no difference in 
"fixed asset turnover'' is rejected, with the alternative H1 : ( 4) µ121 * µ221' stating that 
there is a difference being accepted. 
4.2.2.1.3 Comparative analysis 
The fixed asset turnover of owner-controlled companies has stayed above the one of 
management-controlled companies throughout the entire research period. This could 
mean that, relative to the level of fixed assets used, owner-controlled companies have 
generated more sales than their management-controlled counterparts. However, as 
mentioned above, this ratio can be positively affected in instances where a company 
leases more fixed assets than it buys or keeps old and/or fully depreciated fixed assets, 
with high rental and/or maintenance costs being incurred. 
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For both groups, the highest fixed asset turnover was achieved in 1989, when the ratio 
was at 21 .64 for the owner-controlled companies and 7.28 for the management-
controlled ones. 
A decline which started after 1989 for the two groups was reversed for owner-
controlled companies in 1991 when the ratio, after reaching a low of 10.05 commenced 
its upward trend until 1995. Regarding management-controlled companies, the decline in 
their fixed asset turnover persisted until 1994. In that year, the ratio attained a low of 
5.86 prior to bouncing to 6.32 in 1995. A graphical illustration in Figure 4.4 facilitates a 
direct comparison between the two groups. 
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Figure 4.4 : Fixed asset turnover. 
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4.2.2.2 TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER 
The total asset turnover ratio is useful in appraising the company's ability to utilise its 
asset base efficiently to generate sales. 
A low total asset turnover ratio, when compared to other companies in the industry, may 
indicate that a company has too much investment in current and/or fixed assets relative 
to sales. However, it should also be noted that this ratio could be positively affected in 
instances where a company leases more fixed assets than it buys or keeps old and/or 
fully depreciated fixed assets. 
4.2.2.2.1 Presentation of data 
Data related to the total asset turnover ratio are reflected in Table 4.9 below. 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
2.80 
1.97 
4.2.2.2.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1990 
2.33 
1.95 
1991 
2.29 
1.89 
1992 
2.27 
1.78 
Table 4.9: Total asset turnover data. 
1993 
2.47 
1.77 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (5) 
1994 
2.45 
1.77 
This means that there is no difference in "total asset turnover" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
1995 
2.46 
1.80 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "total asset turnover" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
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Applying the pooled-variance t test on data contained in Table 4.9, at the ex= .05 level 
of significance, a set of statistical results are obtained and reflected in Table 4 .IO. 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Grouo A) Variable 1 (Grouo BJ 
2.4389 1.8466 
0.0329 
7.0000 
0.0203 
0.0000 
12.0000 
7.7805 
0.0000 
2.1788 
0.0077 
7.0000 
Table 4.10: Statistical results on "total asset turnover" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.10 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = 7. 7805 > t12 = 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : ( 5) µ122 = µ= of no difference in 
''total asset turnover" is rejected, with the alternative H 1 : ( 5) µ122 "' µ222, stating that 
there is a difference being accepted. 
4.2.2.2.3 Comparative analysis 
The total asset turnover ratio of owner-controlled companies has been above the one of 
management-controlled companies throughout the entire research period. This could 
mean that, relative to the level of total assets used, owner-controlled companies have 
generated more sales than their management-controlled counterparts. However, as 
mentioned above, this ratio could be positively affected in instances where a company 
leases more fixed assets than it buys or keeps old and/or fully depreciated fixed assets, 
with high rental and/ or maintenance costs being incurred. 
For both groups, the highest fixed asset turnover was achieved in 1989, when the ratio 
was at 2.80 for owner-controlled companies and 1.97 for management-controlled 
companies. 
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During the entire research period, the total asset turnover ratio of management-
controlled companies has stayed below 2, with its lowest level being seen in 1993 and 
1994 at 1. 77. With regard to owner-controlled companies, the total asset turnover ratio 
has stayed above 2.25 and its lowest level occurred in 1992 at 2.27. 
A straightforward comparison between the two groups is depicted in Figure 4.5. 
3.0 
2.8 
2.6 
~2.4 
E::: 
~ 2.2 
2.0 
1.8 
1.6 
- \ 
\ 
\ 
. 
. 
1989 
\ •• / 
~ !!- / 
-
'"' 
~ 
-----
·r--._ 
.,.. .. 
·-
- --
I 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
YEARS 
1--- GROUP A...._ GROUP Bl 
Figure 4 .5 : Total asset turnover. 
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4.2.3 LIQUIDITY 
Liquidity ratios are computed in order to provide an indication of how quicky a 
company's current assets can be converted to cash in order to pay current liabilities. For 
a company to survive, it must maintain enough liquidity to meet current obligations 
when they fall due. 
It should be noted that short-term lenders carefully monitor liquidity ratios as they 
advance short-term credit to finance current assets. The key liquidity ratio analysed 
under this subsection is the current ratio. 
4.2.3.1 CURRENT RATIO 
The current ratio is related to net working capital, as it calculates the ratio between the 
current assets and current liabilities. It is used to appraise the ability of a company to 
satisfy its current debt out of current assets. 
If the current ratio is too low, creditors may become reluctant to grant further credit to 
the company as they will be concerned about the company's ability to meet its current 
obligations. If it is too high, it may indicate that cash, inventories and/or accounts 
receivable are too high. 
While high accounts receivable may be seen as a result of poor collection policies and/or 
a too lenient credit policy, a level of inventories which is too high may indicate the 
existence of old or slow moving stock. 
4.2.3.1.1 Presentation of data 
Current ratio data are reflected in Table 4.11 below. 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
1.66 
1.49 
1990 
1.62 
1.54 
1991 
1.58 
1.61 
1992 
1.58 
1.58 
Table 4.11 : Current ratio data. 
-64-
1993 
1.72 
1.58 
1994 
1.61 
1.62 
1995 
1.73 
1.61 
4.2.3.1.2 Hypothesis-testing 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (6) 
This means that there is no difference in "current ratio" between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
HI: (6) 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "current ratio" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Statistical results obtained from the application of the pooled-variance t test procedure 
to data in Table 4.11, at the a= .05 level of significance, are reflected in Table 4.12 
below. 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Grouo A) Variable 2 (Grouo BJ 
1.6424 1.5753 
0.0039 0.0021 
7.0000 7.0000 
0.0030 
0.0000 
12.0000 
2.2917 
0.0408 
2.1788 
Table 4 .12 : Statistical results on "current ratio" testing. 
-65-
From the results reflected in Table 4.12 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
Ast= 2.2917 > t12 = 2.1788, the null hypothesisH0 : (6) µ131 = µ231 of no difference in 
"current ratio" is rejected, with the alternative H1 : (6) µ131 * µ23,, stating that there is a 
difference being accepted. 
4.2.3.1.3 Comparative analysis 
Figure 4.6 hereafter depicts a straightforward comparison between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies data as reflected in Table 4.11. 
Although the current ratio of owner-controlled companies has been in general above the 
one of their management-controlled counterparts, it is deemed important to mention that 
the ratio has been above 1.45 for both groups. 
In 1993 and 1995, the owner-controlled companies reached the summits ofl.72 and 
1.73 respectively. The lowest levels for this group of companies were seen in 1991 and 
1992 when the ratio stayed around 1.58. Regarding management controlled companies, 
the highest current ratio was achieved in 1994 at 1. 62, with the bottom being realised in 
1989 at 1.49. 
The current ratio of management-controlled companies was higher than that of owner-
controlled companies only twice during the entire research period: in 1991, 1.61 against 
1.58 and in 1994, 1.62 against 1.61. 
From a direct comparison, one can be concluded that owner-controlled companies have 
been more liquid than management-controlled companies. Seen in perspective together 
with other ratios, such as profitability and asset management ratios, it appears that 
owner-controlled companies have been more focussed in their operations on current 
assets/liabilities than on long-term investments. 
The current assets as percentage of total assets have been around 65% and 60% for 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies respectively. 
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Figure 4. 6 : Current ratio. 
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4.2.4 LEVERAGE 
Leverage refers to the use of debt to enhance the rate of return on equity. It is generally 
true to state that the financial stability of a company depends on the equity provided by 
its shareholders, including retained earnings. The more equity that a company has, the 
more financially stable it will be_ Leverage occurs when a company borrows funds at a 
cost that is less than it earns on investments. 
Three ratios examined under this subsection are total debt to total equity, total debt to 
total assets and long-term debt to total assets. Data related to these ratios are expressed 
in percentage. 
4.2.4.1 TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY 
The total debt to equity ratio tests the financial stability of a company by measuring the 
total investment by creditors against the total investment of its shareholders/owners. 
Due to the fact that a high degree of debt in the capital structure may make it difficult 
for a company to satisfy interest charges and principal payments at maturity, this ratio is 
found to be a major solvency measure. 
A high total debt to equity ratio usually indicates a risky investment for lenders as the 
coverage of asset values over amounts owing is very slim. In addition, excessive debt is 
often seen as a sign ofless financial stability due to the fact that the company will have 
more difficulty to obtain funds during a tight money market. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, if management can identify profitable investments, 
additional debt or leverage could sometimes make the company more profitable. The 
important trade-off in choosing the most efficient way to obtain funds (through debt or 
equity) is risk versus profits. 
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4.2.4.1.1 Presentation of data 
Data related to the total debt to equity ratio are reflected in Table 4.13 below (in%). 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
146.53 
138.17 
4.2.4.1.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1990 
147.88 
137.38 
1991 
141.26 
129.29 
1992 
138.89 
125.41 
Table 4.13 : Total debt to equity data. 
1993 
134.24 
119.35 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (7) 
1994 
130.51 
122.78 
1995 
144.30 
118.70 
This means that there is no difference in "total debt to equity" between owner-controlled 
and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "total debt to equity" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Statistical results obtained from the application of the pooled-variance t test on data 
contained in Table 4.13, at the a= .OS level of significance, are reflected in Table 4.14 
below. 
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Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Group A> Variable 2 (Group BJ 
140.5146 127.2986 
41.2324 64.1531 
7.0000 7.0000 
52.6928 
0.0000 
12.0000 
3.4061 
0.0052 
2.1788 
Table 4 .14 : Statistical results on ''total debt to equity" testiug. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.14 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = 3 .4061 > t12 = 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (7) µm = µ241 of no difference in 
"total debt to equity'' is rejected, with the alternative H1 : (7) µ141 * µ241' stating that 
there is a difference being confirmed. 
4.2.4.1.3 Comparative analysis 
The total debt to equity ratio of owner-controlled companies has been higher than the 
one of management-controlled companies throughout the entire research period which 
could mean that management-controlled companies have been financially more stable 
than owner-controlled companies. 
It should be noted that management-controlled companies have effectively maintained a 
declining trend during the research period except in 1994 when the ratio, after reaching 
119.35 in 1993, jumped to 122.78 in 1994 prior to falling back to 118.70 in 1995. The 
highest total debt to equity ratio of management-controlled companies was attained in 
1989 at 138.17 and the lowest in 1995 at 118.70. 
With regard to owner-controlled companies, the summit was attained in 1990 at 147.88 
after which the ratio started a declining trend. The lowest level was achieved in 1994 at 
130.51, with the ratio climbing back to 144.30 in 1995. 
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In the light of this analysis, it is obvious to mention that for each I 00 rand invested by 
shareholders owner-controlled companies have borrowed more funds than their 
management-controlled counterparts, which might result in high interest charges being 
incurred. 
Figure 4.7 below depicts a straightforward comparison between the two groups of 
comparues. 
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Figure 4 .7 : Total debt to equity. 
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4.2.4.2 TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 
The total debt to total assets ratio is another test for financial stability as it measures the 
amount of financing provided by creditors against all the assets of the company. In other 
words, this ratio reveals the percentage of total funds obtained from creditors in 
comparison to all the company's assets. 
Generally speaking, the company with a lower total debt to total assets ratio is 
considered more stable financially than the one for which the ratio is higher. Creditors 
would prefer to see a low total debt to total assets ratio since there is a better cushion 
for possible losses if the company goes bankrupt. 
It should be noted that an optimum total debt to total assets ratio may exist and that at 
that level the weighted average cost of capital will be less than at any other total debt to 
total assets level. 
4.2.4.2.1 Presentation of data 
Table 4.15 contains data related to the total debt to total assets ratio (in%). 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
53.10 
53.85 
1990 
53.40 
53.62 
1991 
54.67 
53.22 
1992 
53.75 
52.23 
Table 4.15 : Total debt to total assets data. 
4.2.4.2.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1993 
52.65 
51.09 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H0 : (8) 
1994 
53.53 
51.38 
1995 
54.32 
50.92 
This means that there is no difference in "total debt to total assets" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
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Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "total debt to total assets" between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Statistical results obtained from the application of the pooled-variance t test on data 
contained in Table 4.15, at the a= .05 level of significance, are reflected in Table 4.16 
below. 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable I (Grouv A) Variable 2 (Grouv B) 
53.6319 52.3301 
0.4790 1.5355 
1.0000 1.0000 
1.0073 
0.0000 
12.0000 
2.4265 
0.0319 
2.1788 
Table 4.16 : Statistical results on "total debt to total assets" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.16 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = 2.4265 > t12 = 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (8) µ142 = µ242 of no difference in 
"total debt to total assets" is rejected, with the alternative H 1 : (8) µ142 * µ242, stating 
that there is a difference being confirmed. 
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4.2.4.2.3 Comparative analysis 
The total debt to total assets ratio of owner-controlled companies has been above the 
one of management-controlled companies throughout the entire research period except 
in 1989 and 1990. This can generally mean that management-controlled companies have 
been financially more stable than their owner-controlled counterparts (after 1990), since 
the proportion of their debt against their total assets has been lower than that of owner-
controlled companies for the major part of the research period. 
Similarly to the total debt to equity ratio discussed in the previous subsection, 
management-controlled companies effectively maintained a declining trend during the 
period under review except in 1994 when the ratio, after reaching 51.09 in 1993, jumped 
to 51.38 in 1994 prior to decreasing to 50.92 in 1995. The highest total debt to equity 
ratio of management-controlled companies was attained in 1989 at 53.85 and the lowest 
in 1995 at 50.92. 
With regard to owner-controlled companies, the highest level was attained in 1991 at 
54.67. After that year, the ratio started a declining trend which was quickly reversed two 
years later. The lowest level achieved by owner-controlled companies in terms of their 
total debt to total assets ratio was seen in 1993 at 52.65. This was followed by a jump to 
53.53 in 1994 and 54.32 in 1995. 
This analysis reveals that for each 100 rand of total assets owner-controlled companies 
have in general borrowed more funds than their management-controlled counterparts, 
which might result in high interest charges being incurred. 
Figure 4.8 below depicts a straightforward comparison between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies. 
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Figure 4.8 : Total debt to total assets. 
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4.2.4.3 LONG-TERM DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 
The long-term debt to total assets ratio assesses the financial stability of a company by 
measuring the amount of financing provided by creditors in terms oflong-term debt 
against all the assets held by that company. 
In order to generate accurate conclusions in respect of financial stability, the long-term 
debt to total assets ratio should not be analysed in isolation but rather in conjunction 
with the two other leverage ratios, namely the total debt to equity and total debt to total 
assets since this ratio can easily be distorted by an excessive use of current liabilities. 
4.2.4.3.1 Presentation of data 
Data pertaining to the long-term debt to total assets ratio are reflected in Table 4.17 
below (in%). 
GROUP A 
GROUPB 
1989 
7.90 
9.32 
1990 
9.38 
11.44 
1991 
9.99 
12.54 
1992 
8.79 
11.10 
Table 4.17 : Long-term debt to total assets data. 
4.2.4.3.2 Hypothesis-testing 
1993 
8.60 
9.76 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
H 0 : (9) 
1994 
7.39 
9.37 
1995 
7.78 
7.84 
This means that there is no difference in "long-term debt to total assets" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
H1 : (9) 
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This alternative means that there is a difference in "long-term debt to total assets" 
between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Afiica_ 
Applying the pooled-variance t test on data contained in Table 4 .17 , at the a = _ 05 level 
of significance, a set of statistical results are obtained and reflected in Table 4-18_ 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 fGroun Al 
8-5474 
0.8662 
7.0000 
1.6852 
0.0000 
12.0000 
-2-3754 
0.0351 
2.1788 
Variable 2 fGroun B) 
10.1957 
2-5042 
7.0000 
Table 4. 18 : Statistical results on "long-term debt to total assets" testing. 
From the results reflected in Table 4.18 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are + 2.1788 and - 2.1788. 
As t = - 2.3754 < t12 = - 2.1788, the null hypothesis H0 : (9) µ143 = µ243 of no difference 
in "long-term debt to total assets" is rejected, with the alternative H 1 : (9) µ143 "' µ24-,, 
stating that there is a difference being accepted. 
4.2.4.3.3 Comparative analysis 
Contrary to the two leverage ratios analysed in the previous subsections, the long-term 
debt to total assets ratio of management-controlled companies has been higher than that 
of owner-controlled companies throughout the period covered by the study_ 
Seen in conjunction with the results obtained from the analysis of the total debt to equity 
and total debt to total assets ratios, it can be concluded that owner-controlled companies 
have used more current liabilities in their operations than long-term financing. 
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For both groups the ratio has followed a quasi-similar trend, increasing from 7.90 in 
1989 to 9.99 in 1991 for owner-controlled companies and from 9.32 in 1989 to 12.54 in 
1991 for management-controlled companies. The declining move which started after 
1991 was effectively maintained by management-controlled companies achieving a low 
of7.84 in 1995. Regarding owner-controlled companies, the lowest level was attained 
in 1994 at 7.39, with the ratio jumping to 7.78 in 1995. 
A graphical illustration in Figure 4. 9 facilitates a direct comparison between the two 
groups. 
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Figure 4.9 : Long-term debt to total assets. 
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4.2.5 DIVIDEND PAYMENT 
Dividend payment is one of the three basic decisions facing financial management. As 
mentioned in subsection 1. 4. 4, dividend decisions refer to the decisions which are made 
in respect of the retention of earnings for re-investment or payment of dividends to 
shareholders. 
Referring to subsection 2.3.2, moreover, it is deemed important to note that the 
(ir)relevance of a company's dividend policy has been the subject of much debate in the 
finance literature, with various contradictory statements being formulated. 
The key dividend payment ratio analysed here is the dividend pay-out ratio. 
4.2.5.1 DIVIDEND PAY-OUT RATIO 
The dividend pay-out ratio is obtained by dividing the amount of dividend per share to 
the earning per share. This ratio facilitates the assessment of the dividend policy adopted 
by management as well as its impact on the financial conditions of the company. 
While a higher dividend pay-out ratio is considered as a sign of financial maturity for 
well established companies, those with a lower dividend pay-out ratio are considered as 
being in search of growth through retained earnings. 
If the dividend pay-out ratio declines, shareholders may be concerned as they would 
tend to believe that the company is decreasing dividends due to financial problems. 
4.2.5.1.1 Presentation of data 
Dividend pay-out data for owner-controlled and management-controlled companies are 
reflected in Table 4.19 below. 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GROUP A 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.27 0.29 0.31 
GROUPB 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.33 
Table 4. 19 : Dividend pay-out ratio data. 
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4.2.5.1.2 Hypothesis-testing 
The representation of the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows : 
This means that there is no difference in "dividend pay-out ratio" between owner-
controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
Should the above be rejected, the alternative to be confirmed is as follows : 
This alternative means that there is a difference in "dividend pay-out ratio" between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
The application of the pooled-variance t test procedure to data contained in Table 4.19, 
at the a = . 05 level of significance has produced a set of statistical results reflected in 
Table 4.20 below. 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pooled Variance 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
Variable 1 (Grouo Al Variable 2 (Grouo BJ 
0.3127 0.3777 
0.0013 0.0011 
7.0000 7.0000 
0.0012 
0.0000 
12.0000 
-3.5472 
0.0040 
2.1788 
Table 4.20 : Statistical results on "dividend pay-out ratio" testing. 
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From the results reflected in Table 4.20 above, the critical values for this two-tailed test 
are+ 2.1788 and - 2.1788_ 
Ast= - 3.5472 < 112 = - 2.1788, the null hypothesisH0 : (10) µ151 = µ251 of no difference 
in "dividend pay-out ratio" is rejected, with the alternative H 1 : (10) µ151 "' µ25,, stating 
that there is a difference being confirmed. 
4.2.5.1.3 Comparative analysis 
Figure 4 .10 below depicts a straightforward comparison in dividend pay-out ratio 
between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa. 
This comparison brings some clarifications in respect of dividend payment theories 
examined in chapter 2. 
Scrutiny of data related to the dividend pay-out ratio as reflected in Table 4.19 reveals 
that the ratio of management-controlled companies has been higher than that of owner-
controlled companies during the entire research period which could be interpreted as a 
sign of financial maturity on the part of management-controlled companies. 
In other words, it can be stated that out of earnings available to shareholders, owner-
controlled companies have paid less dividends than their management-controlled 
counterparts. This could mainly be ascribed to the fact that owner-managers, being 
capitalists, cannot easily accept to lose their control by issuing new equity but will be 
willing to undertake financing via debts or retained earnings. 
The highest dividend pay-out ratio achieved by management-controlled companies was 
0.42 in 1992, with the lowest being 0.33 in 1995. Regarding owner-controlled 
companies, the summit was attained in 1991 at 0.37 and the bottom in 1993 at 0.27. 
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Figure 4.10 : Dividend pay-out ratio. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the application of the pooled-variance t test procedure 
on data related to the selected financial ratios has led to the rejection of all the statistical 
equalities representing the null hypothesis, with their alternatives being accepted. 
A comparative analysis performed on profitability has indicated that management-
controlled companies have been more efficient than their owner-controlled counterparts, 
as their profit margin on sales, return on total assets and return on equity ratios have 
been above those of owner-controlled companies throughout the research period. 
Although the fixed asset and total asset turnover ratios have highlighted that owner-
controlled companies have generated, relative to the level of fixed and total assets used, 
more sales than their management-controlled counterparts, the impact ofthis on the net 
income has been found to be annihilated or reduced by excessive costs which might 
include, inter alia, rentals, high maintenance costs as well as interest charges on debts. 
Due to the total debt to equity and total debt to total assets ratios of owner-controlled 
companies being higher than those of the management-controlled companies, the 
possibility of the former incurring higher interest charges than the latter could not be 
excluded. Scrutiny of the long-term debt to total assets in conjunction with other 
leverage ratios has revealed that owner-controlled companies use more short-term debt 
in their operations than long-term financing, which has had an impact on their current 
ratio. In terms ofleverage analysis, it can be concluded that management-controlled 
companies have been more mature financially than their owner-controlled counterparts. 
With regard to dividend payment, it has been noted that management-controlled 
companies have, out of earnings available to shareholders, paid higher dividends than 
owner-controlled companies. This could mainly be ascribed to the fact that owner-
managers, being capitalists, would prefer high retention and low dividends, as they are 
not willing to lose their control by issuing new equity. 
In the light of the above, it is evident that the financial strategies of owner-managers 
have been different from those adopted by non-owner managers, which has resulted in 
the financial performance of owner-controlled companies being significantly different 
from that of the management-controlled ones. 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The financial performance of owner-controlled and management-controlled companies 
should be identical since the primary management objective should be the maximisation of 
the wealth of shareholders_ However, as demonstrated by Van Horne (1974), the 
maximisation of the shareholders' wealth is an appropriate guide for how a company 
should act, but not necessarily how it does act. 
Considering the separation of ownership and control, managers do not always have the 
same relationship with the companies they manage. While owner-controlled companies are 
managed by their owners, management-controlled companies are being run by non-
owners_ 
It is deemed important to mention that non-owner managers are bureaucrats who owe 
their positions to their managerial ability instead of ownership. They possess required 
skills, expertise and qualifications and are expected to run their companies more profitably 
than owner-managers who generally owe their positions to their ownership. 
With all these differences between owner- and non-owner managers, one cannot disregard 
the possibility of differences in objectives, motivation and strategies which consequently 
will affect the financial performance. 
This study has been designed to establish whether there is a significant difference in 
financial performance between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in 
South Africa, as a result of the separation of ownership and control. 
Following the analysis of data, this last chapter concludes the research by reviewing its 
process, summarising the results and formulating the necessary recommendations_ 
Suggestions for further study and concluding remarks are also presented. 
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5.2 REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PRQCESS 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, theories and literature related to the separation of 
ownership and control as well as the financial performance of owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies have highlighted a variety of contradictions, 
inconsistencies and inconclusive assumptions. 
The impact of the separation of ownership and control on the financial performance has 
not, as yet, been clearly determined, with certain economists such as Shelton ( 196 7) 
claiming that owner-controlled companies are more efficient than management-controlled 
companies whereas others, as demonstrated by Nichols (1969), support the opposite view. 
In order to establish whether there is a significant difference in the financial performance 
of owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa, this study has 
used various mathematical and statistical procedures for both the primary treatment of raw 
data to obtain analysable variables and the hypothesis-testing procedure. 
Due to the fact that the study covered the period from 1989 to 1995, it has been deemed 
imperative for analysable companies to be in operation as listed companies during this 
period. The identification of companies complying with this requirement has been 
undertaken through a modern mathematical approach of intersection between two sets of 
elements, one representing companies which were listed as at the beginning of the first 
year of the research period (1989) and another representing those which were listed as at 
the end of the last year of the research period (1995). 
Following the above phase, cleansing and discarding of anomalies on the obtained results 
have been performed with a view to eliminating companies with missing, incomplete 
and/or inappropriate data. Subsequently, remaining companies have been classified as 
either owner-controlled or management-controlled according to their shareholding 
structure. 
The two samples analysed in this study have been randomly selected from the two 
categories of companies (owner-controlled and management-controlled) and matched 
according the standard industrial classification (SIC) in order to avoid the effects of the 
inter-industry variances, thereby ensuring the accuracy and validity of the analysis. 
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The specific financial ratios related to the financial aspects under analysis, namely 
profitability, asset management, liquidity, leverage and dividend payment have been 
calculated per company and per year throughout the research period. Grouped either as 
owner-controlled or management-controlled, data have been submitted to a descriptive 
statistics treatment in order to generate analysable variables. 
The research hypothesis has been tested using the pooled-variance t test procedure which 
has been individually applied to each financial ratio in order to establish whether there is a 
difference between the two groups. 
Identified differences have been furthermore subjected to a comparative analysis between 
the two groups, with graphical illustrations being used to facilitate a straightforward 
companson. 
5.3 SYNTHESIS OF RESUl,TS AND FINDINGS 
Considering the results obtained from the hypothesis-testing, whereby all the statistical 
equalities representing the null hypothesis of no difference have been rejected, with their 
alternatives being consequently accepted, this study has come to a conclusion that there is 
a significant difference in financial performance between owner-controlled and 
management-controlled companies in South Afiica, as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control. 
A comparative analysis performed on profitability, has indicated that management-
controlled companies have been more efficient than their owner-controlled counterparts, 
as their profit margin on sales, return on total assets and return on equity ratios have been 
higher than those of owner-controlled companies during the entire research period. This 
could mainly be ascribed to a more effective cost structure and control. 
From the evaluation of the asset management ratios, it has been noted that owner-
controlled companies have generated, relative to the level of fixed and total assets used, 
more sales than their management-controlled counterparts. However, seen in conjunction 
with the profitability ratios, it appears that the impact of the sales volume on the net 
income has been found to be annihilated or reduced by excessive costs. This could result 
from owner-controlled companies leasing and/or using old or fully depreciated assets, with 
high rentals and/or high maintenance costs being incurred. 
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In analysing data pertaining to the current ratio, one can conclude that owner-controlled 
companies have been more liquid than management-controlled companies. Seen in 
perspective together with profitability and asset management ratios, it appears that owner-
controlled companies have been more focussed on current assets/liabilities than on long-
term investments. 
Due to the total debt to equity and total debt to total assets ratios of management-
controlled companies being lower than those of their owner-controlled counterparts, it has 
been noted that management-controlled companies have been more mature financially than 
their owner-controlled counterparts. In addition, the possibility of owner-controlled 
companies incurring, relative to the assets used, higher interest charges than management-
controlled companies could not be excluded. 
Furthermore, scrutiny of the long-term debt to total assets in conjunction with other 
leverage ratios as well as the current ratio has revealed that owner -controlled companies 
use more short-term debt in their operations than long-term financing. 
With regard to the payment of dividends, the study has highlighted that management-
controlled companies have, out of earnings available to shareholders, paid higher 
dividends than owner-controlled companies. This could mainly be ascribed to the fact that 
owner-managers, being capitalists, would prefer high retention and low dividends, as they 
are not willing to lose their control by issuing new equity. 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIQNS 
In order to improve profitability, managers of owner-controlled companies should analyse 
their cost items with a view to identifying and eliminating those found unable to add value. 
The implementation and maintenance of effective cost control mechanisms should be made 
a priority. 
In line with the above, decisions related to leasing or buying of assets should be based on 
proper evaluation techniques designed to determine the most profitable options for the 
company. Assets which have become more expensive to maintain and/or operate should be 
identified, with the most cost-effective decisions, for example replacements, being made 
when deemed necessary. 
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Although a low total debt to equity or to total assets ratio indicates Jess risk, if 
management can identify profitable investments, additional debt or leverage could make 
the company more profitable. Nonetheless, it is imperative for management to try to 
maximise profits without incurring a level of debt which will bring too much risk to the 
company. 
In their long-term financing decisions, owner-controlled companies should establish an 
optimal capital structure and use it as a target when arranging their finances. 
As many shareholders rely on dividends to meet their expenses and are inconvenienced 
should the dividend stream be unstable, it is preferable for owner-controlled companies to 
balance their internal needs for funds against the needs of their shareholders. The fact that 
they always pay lower dividends out of earnings available to shareholders than their 
management-controlled counterparts does not work in their favour as this can send 
unattractive signals to investors. 
5.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This research is considered as a clearing of the ground for further studies in the area of the 
separation of ownership and control as well as the evaluation of the financial performance 
of South African companies. 
Due to data availability, only industrial companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange have been selected for analysis and classified as owner-controlled or 
management-controlled companies in terms of their shareholding structure, with the study 
covering seven years from 1989 to 1995. 
It is deemed necessary for this study to be replicated using a different time period with a 
view to ensuring the generalisation of its conclusions beyond the period it has covered. 
Furthermore, the study should be extended to include a third sample consisting of 
privately held companies which are managed by their owners. All the three samples to be 
analysed, namely the privately held companies managed by their owners, listed owner-
controlled companies and listed management-controlled companies should also be 
randomly selected and matched according the standard industrial classification (SIC). 
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5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has established that there is a significant difference in financial performance 
between owner-controlled and management-controlled companies in South Africa through 
the analysis of specific financial ratios representing profitability, asset management, 
liquidity, leverage and dividend payment_ 
In the light of the hypothesis-testing and comparative analysis results, it has been noted 
that management-controlled companies have been more efficient and more mature 
financially than their owner-controlled counterparts, with a dividend pay-out ratio being 
also higher during the entire research period_ 
It is believed that this study has enhanced the body of the financial literature by positively 
contributing to the analysis of the situation in respect of the separation of ownership and 
control and its impact on the financial performance of South African companies_ 
The study has, furthermore, provided a better understanding of problems facing 
companies' management in South Africa and has formulated recommendations for the 
implementation of corrective and value-adding actions where required. 
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ANNEXURE 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS • ANNEXUREA1 
OWNER-CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP A) 
PRMSB9 PRMS90 PRMS91 PRMS92 PRMS93 PRMS94 PRMS96 ROTASB9 ROTAS90 ROTAS91 ROTAS92 ROTAS93 ROTAS94 ROTAS96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95CXXX 
5.159 
1.166 
4.051 
NA 
5.341 
28.530 
5.036 
2.032 
23.807 
-1.208 
22.599 
108.343 
21.ClXl 
2.285 
5.015 
1.185 
3.687 
NA 
5.432 
29.510 
5.804 
2.240 
23.962 
-0.723 
23.239 
105.306 
21.000 
2.323 
3.904 
1.035 
2.509 
0.000 
4.743 
22.495 
5.484 
2.442 
18.:J92 
0.000 
18.:J92 
81.984 
21.000 
2.029 
3.185 
1.029 
1.564 
NA 
4.714 
22.218 
8.597 
2.621 
22.061 
-1.821 
20.240 
66.878 
21.000 
2.016 
MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP B) 
3.343 
0.997 
1.803 
NA 
4.567 
20.862 
8.244 
2.610 
21.011 
-1.229 
19.782 
70.207 
21.000 
1.954 
4.542 
0.837 
3.510 
NA 
3.835 
14.703 
5.328 
1.980 
16.840 
0.482 
17.322 
95.381 
21.000 
1.640 
4.319 
0.686 
3.672 
NA 
3.142 
9.874 
0.169 
0.854 
11.325 
0.666 
11.991 
90.701 
21.000 
1.344 
8.983 
1.667 
7.006 
NA 
7.637 
58.324 
8.763 
2.537 
38.949 
-2.252 
36.697 
188.639 
21.000 
3.266 
7.660 
1.207 
6.995 
NA 
5.532 
30.&>1 
4.719 
1.673 
27.052 
-1.471 
25.581 
165.054 
21.000 
2.366 
6.193 
1.020 
5.426 
0.000 
4.674 
21.848 
2.036 
1.409 
18.227 
0.000 
18.227 
130.044 
21.000 
1.999 
4.932 
1.012 
4.396 
NA 
4.637 
21.498 
0.232 
0.549 
18.481 
-2.821 
15.660 
103.575 
21.000 
1.983 
5.509 
1.182 
3.895 
NA 
5.419 
29.363 
-0.173 
0.426 
21.138 
.Q.102 
16.036 
117.781 
21.000 
2.318 
7.7&> 
0.950 
7.045 
NA 
4.355 
18.968 
0.101 
0.817 
16.524 
1.465 
17.969 
162.967 
21.000 
1.863 
7.8&> 
0.962 
7.252 
NA 
4.406 
19.417 
0.709 
0.756 
17.576 
1.541 
19.118 
165.058 
21.CXXJ 
1.885 
PRMSB9 PRMS90 PRMS91 PRMS92 PRMS93 PRMS94 PRMS96 ROTASB9 ROTAS90 ROTAS91 ROTAS92 ROTAS93 ROTAS94 ROTAS96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95CXXX 
5.888 
0.571 
5.639 
NA 
2.617 
6.848 
-0.031 
0.300 
10.374 
0.535 
10.909 
123.652 
21.000 
1.119 
5.188 
0.569 
4.651 
NA 
2.6C6 
6.800 
4.367 
1.630 
12.619 
0.841 
13.460 
108.945 
21.000 
1.115 
• PRMS = PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
• ROTAS = RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS 
4.988 
0.514 
4.398 
NA 
2.355 
5.546 
1.185 
0.925 
9.467 
1.162 
10.618 
104.747 
21.000 
1.007 
4.681 
0.619 
4.236 
NA 
2.836 
8.044 
0.052 
0.789 
9.854 
0.513 
10.367 
98.292 
21.000 
1.213 
5.094 
0.614 
4.905 
NA 
2.814 
7.918 
0.136 
0.862 
9.497 
1.504 
11.001 
106.976 
21.000 
1.203 
5.380 
0.656 
5.337 
NA 
3.004 
9.026 
-0.138 
0.332 
10.693 
0.526 
11.219 
112.558 
21.000 
1.285 
5.757 
0.683 
5.061 
NA 
3.132 
9.806 
1.297 
0.959 
13.200 
0.192 
13.401 
120.888 
21.CXXJ 
1.339 
10.505 
0.782 
10.889 
NA 
3.584 
12.846 
3.144 
0.302 
18.720 
1.661 
20.380 
220.607 
21.CXXJ 
1.533 
9.100 
0.639 
9.615 
NA 
2.927 
8.570 
-0.395 
-0.382 
11.248 
2.764 
14.012 
191.295 
21.000 
1.252 
8.723 
0.660 
8.837 
NA 
3.023 
9.141 
1.010 
-0.289 
13.779 
1.662 
15.440 
183.181 
21.000 
1.293 
7.800 
0.876 
7.892 
NA 
4.015 
16.117 
0.993 
0.486 
17.488 
0.766 
18.254 
163.998 
21.000 
1.717 
8.253 
0.768 
8.397 
NA 
3.520 
12.:J92 
0.513 
0.265 
14.473 
2.230 
16.704 
173.321 
21.000 
1.506 
8.694 
0.914 
9.039 
NA 
4.186 
17.526 
0.932 
0.224 
17.822 
0.896 
18.720 
182.571 
21.000 
1.791 
9.506 
0.873 
9.487 
NA 
4.000 
15.997 
2.235 
0.446 
19.694 
0.289 
19.963 
199.623 
21.CXXJ 
1.711 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTD.) • ANNEXUREA2 
OWNER.CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP A) 
ROEQBS ROEQ90 ROEQ91 ROEQ92 ROEQ93 ROEQ94 ROEQ95 FASTRB9 FASTR90 FASTR91 FASTR92 FASTR93 FASTR94 FASTR95 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.951XXX 
18.715 
2.428 
16.190 
NA 
11.125 
123.766 
2.537 
0.719 
55.407 
-6.024 
49.383 
393.015 
21.000 
4.758 
16.646 
1.924 
13.864 
NA 
8.816 
77.718 
0.393 
0.125 
35.366 
-3.750 
31.615 
349.572 
21.000 
3.771 
13.878 
1.996 
14.599 
0.000 
9.148 
83.694 
-0.079 
0.700 
34.791 
0.000 
34.791 
291.445 
21.000 
3.913 
10.393 
1.860 
12.739 
NA 
8.525 
72.671 
-0.468 
-0.058 
31.062 
-5.458 
25.624 
218.259 
21.000 
3.646 
MANAGEMENT .CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP B) 
11.902 
2.066 
11.290 
NA 
9.487 
89.618 
-0'512 
-0.295 
35.452 
-6.929 
26.524 
249.933 
21.000 
4.049 
16.483 
1.543 
18.079 
NA 
7.072 
50.010 
-0.760 
-0.413 
25.396 
2.247 
27.642 
346.150 
21.000 
3.025 
17.797 
2.057 
14.319 
NA 
9.427 
88.862 
-0.480 
0.349 
35.970 
2.667 
38.636 
373.748 
21.000 
4.032 
21.644 
8.778 
7.750 
'NA 
40.224 
1617.944 
8.464 
2.897 
164.066 
1.182 
165.250 
454.527 
21.000 
17.204 
10.870 
3.572 
5.681 
NA 
16.369 
267.949 
14.721 
3.641 
75.880 
1.286 
77.148 
228.270 
21.000 
7.001 
10.053 
2.731 
6.298 
NA 
12.515 
158.622 
10.551 
3.023 
55.938 
1.421 
57.339 
211.106 
21.000 
5.353 
11.344 
3.560 
6.831 
NA 
16.314 
266.140 
10.104 
3.104 
70.637 
1.139 
71.776 
238.228 
21.000 
6.977 
13.040 
3.847 
6.830 
NA 
17.629 
310.774 
4.562 
2.321 
60.787 
1.005 
61.791 
273.845 
21.000 
7.540 
13.841 
4.538 
7.329 
NA 
20.795 
432.418 
6.268 
2.664 
73.821 
1.233 
75.054 
290.657 
21.000 
8.894 
17.049 
6.477 
7.364 
NA 
29.681 
880.939 
7.122 
2.849 
107.986 
1.3S9 
109.344 
358.032 
21.000 
12.894 
ROEQ89 ROEQ90 ROEQ91 ROEQ92 ROEQ93 ROEQ94 ROEQ95 FASTR89 FASTR90 FASTR91 FASTR92 FASTR93 FASTR94 FASTR95 
Meen 
Sid Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtoeis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Con! Lvl(0.951XXX 
23.417 
1.705 
23.016 
NA 
7.815 
61.069 
0.264 
0.250 
31.940 
10.373 
42.313 
491.766 
21.000 
3.342 
20.685 
1.556 
19.591 
NA 
7.129 
50.819 
-0.983 
0.133 
24.671 
7.897 
32.589 
434.388 
21.000 
3.049 
• ROEQ = RETURN ON EQUITY 
• FASTR =FIXED ASSET TURNOVER 
19.564 
1.601 
20.349 
NA 
7.338 
53.840 
-0.025 
-0.265 
28.925 
2.893 
31.817 
410.630 
21.000 
3.138 
17.442 
2.083 
17.606 
NA 
9.545 
91.114 
-0.248 
0.239 
35.980 
1.786 
37.765 
366.279 
21.000 
4.083 
17.639 
1.688 
18.164 
NA 
7.734 
59.821 
-0.475 
-0.051 
27.903 
4.589 
32.472 
370.429 
21.000 
3.306 
18.811 
2.102 
18.192 
NA 
9.632 
92.769 
0.063 
0.217 
38.419 
1.802 
40.221 
396.029 
21.000 
4.119 
19.699 
1.732 
18.651 
NA 
7.938 
63.019 
0.703 
-0.116 
35.152 
0.840 
35.993 
413.685 
21.000 
3.396 
7.281 
1.050 
5.455 
NA 
4.814 
23.171 
0.897 
1.167 
18.695 
1.150 
19.844 
152.909 
21.000 
2.059 
6.267 
0.802 
4.988 
NA 
3.675 
13.508 
-0.720 
0.681 
11.458 
1.133 
12.591 
131.601 
21.000 
1.572 
6.169 
0.834 
5.005 
NA 
3.820 
14.592 
-0.132 
0.923 
12.981 
1.191 
14.172 
129.551 
21.000 
1.834 
5.984 
0.924 
4.591 
NA 
4.234 
17.929 
2.364 
1.615 
16.:nl 
1.127 
17.433 
125.654 
21.000 
1.811 
5.870 
0.876 
5.523 
NA 
4.014 
16.112 
5.055 
1.972 
17.816 
1.184 
19.000 
123.262 
21.000 
1.717 
5.863 
0.841 
4.421 
NA 
3.853 
14.842 
6.256 
2.100 
17.816 
1.230 
19.045 
123.125 
21.000 
1.648 
6.322 
0.959 
5.689 
NA 
4.398 
19.324 
9.551 
2.614 
21.472 
1.137 
22.609 
132.755 
21.000 
1.880 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTD.) " ANNEXURE A3 
OWNER.CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP A) 
TASTR89 TASTR9<J TASTR91 TASTR92 TASTR93 TASTR94 TASTR96 CURAT89 CURAT90 CURAT91 CURAT92 CURAT93 CURAT94 CURAT96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95CXXX 
2.804 
0.565 
1.865 
NA 
2.566 
6.698 
5.869 
2.349 
10.887 
0.585 
11.471 
58.893 
21.CXXJ 
1.107 
2.3:33 
0.346 
1.833 
NA 
1.586 
2.516 
1.991 
1.701 
5.705 
0.750 
6.465 
48.993 
21.000 
0.678 
2.292 
0.328 
1.600 
NA 
1.501 
2.254 
1.725 
1.660 
4.936 
0.630 
5.765 
46.129 
21.000 
0.642 
MANAGEMENT .CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP B) 
2.267 
0.318 
1.627 
NA 
1.457 
2.122 
2.231 
1.755 
5.216 
0.774 
5.900 
47.007 
21.000 
0.623 
2.471 
0.371 
1.641 
NA 
1.696 
2.883 
1.742 
1.631 
5.949 
0.721 
6.670 
51.699 
21.000 
0.726 
2.445 
0.427 
1.783 
NA 
1.965 
3.821 
4.829 
2.270 
7.825 
0.751 
6.576 
51.342 
21.000 
0.836 
2.4&J 
0.391 
1.975 
NA 
1.790 
3.204 
5.563 
2.258 
7.680 
0.713 
8.393 
51.657 
21.000 
0.766 
1.662 
0.100 
1.436 
NA 
0.735 
0.540 
0.328 
1.211 
2.427 
0.804 
3.231 
34.906 
21.000 
0.314 
1.621 
0.215 
1.366 
NA 
0.984 
0.969 
4.200 
2.066 
3.713 
0.715 
4.429 
34.048 
21.000 
0.421 
1.582 
0.170 
1.424 
NA 
0.780 
0.009 
4.797 
1.839 
3.472 
0.653 
4.125 
33.212 
21.000 
0.334 
1.578 
0.136 
1.462 
NA 
0.623 
0.366 
0 . .<182 
0.906 
2.261 
0.773 
3.054 
33.141 
21.000 
0.267 
1.717 
0.216 
1.409 
NA 
0.990 
0.979 
5.563 
2.145 
4.236 
0.797 
5.033 
36.052 
21.000 
0.423 
1.006 
0.158 
1.416 
NA 
0.726 
0.527 
6.162 
2.262 
3.200 
0.870 
4.070 
33.722 
21.000 
0.310 
1.731 
0.177 
1.447 
NA 
0.811 
0.658 
2.051 
1.536 
3.111 
0.851 
3.962 
36.342 
21.000 
0.347 
TASTR89 TASTR90 TASTR91 TASTR92 TASTR93 TASTR94 TASTR96 CURAT89 CURAT90 CURAT91 CURAT92 CURAT93 CURAT94 CURAT96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95CXXX 
1.967 
0.121 
1.847 
NA 
0.ffi2 
0.305 
0.118 
0.318 
2.270 
0.831 
3.101 
41.307 
21.000 
0.236 
1.953 
0.132 
1.793 
NA 
0.004 
0.365 
0.336 
0.445 
2.442 
0.846 
3.286 
41.014 
21.000 
0.258 
• TASTR =TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER 
"CURAT =CURRENT RATIO 
1.887 
0.120 
1.866 
NA 
0.546 
0.300 
0.821 
0.463 
2.324 
0.888 
3.213 
39.636 
21.000 
0.234 
1.783 
0.106 
1.797 
NA 
0.493 
0.243 
1.970 
0.896 
2.288 
0.850 
3.139 
37.435 
21.000 
0.211 
1.786 
0.116 
1.712 
NA 
0.532 
0.283 
1.206 
0.766 
2.175 
0.849 
3.024 
37.074 
21.000 
0.228 
1.766 
0.112 
1.728 
NA 
0.513 
0.263 
0.950 
0.573 
2.052 
0.848 
2.900 
37.121 
21.000 
0.219 
1.803 
0.113 
1.750 
NA 
0.519 
0.269 
0.121 
.(J.cXJ7 
2.064 
0.738 
2.802 
37.869 
21.000 
0.222 
1.489 
0.101 
1.373 
NA 
0.464 
0.216 
7.015 
2.206 
2.131 
0.985 
3.115 
31.271 
21.000 
0.199 
1.544 
0.115 
1.449 
NA 
0.528 
0.279 
7.145 
2.229 
2.437 
0.961 
3.398 
32.415 
21.000 
0.226 
1.009 
0.133 
1.537 
NA 
0.008 
0.370 
9.822 
2.739 
2.874 
1.005 
3.880 
33.796 
21.000 
0.200 
1.575 
0.119 
1.501 
NA 
0.544 
0.296 
6.178 
1.848 
2.632 
0.783 
3.416 
33.061 
21.000 
0.233 
1.582 
0.115 
1.533 
NA 
0.527 
0.278 
4.504 
1.587 
2.446 
0.837 
3.283 
33.219 
21.000 
0.226 
1.620 
0.126 
1.669 
NA 
0.586 
0.343 
4.218 
1.437 
2.861 
0.840 
3.491 
34.025 
21.000 
0.251 
1.008 
0.123 
1.582 
NA 
0.565 
0.319 
2.444 
1.173 
2.426 
0.850 
3.276 
33.771 
21.000 
0.242 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTD.)* ANNEXURE A4 
OWNER-CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP A) 
DEIEQB9 DEIEQBO DEIEQ91 DEIEQ92 DEIEQ93 DEIEQ94 DEIEQ96 TODAS89 TODAS90 TODAS91 TODAS92 TODAS93 TODAS94 TODAS95 
Mean 
Sid Error 
Median 
Mode 
Sid Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
conf Lvl(O.recxxx 
146.630 147.877 141.258 
26.542 26.566 17. 745 
124. 138 114.cal 121.538 
NA NA NA 
121.630 121.740 81.319 
14793.916 14820.672 6612.758 
9.573 7.719 1.649 
2. 712 2.513 1.364 
567.&Xl 556.096 315.666 
30.417 21.005 45.528 
597.917 
3077.121 
21.000 
52.021 
580.000 381.194 
3105.418 2966.420 
21.000 
52.068 
21.000 
34.780 
138.886 134.240 
21.296 20.943 
102.899 101.471 
NA NA 
97.599 95.97 4 
130.510 
16.532 
105.005 
NA 
75.759 
9525.509 9211.007 5739.416 
6.267 6.453 1.009 
2.262 2.230 1.385 
430.246 420.438 296.433 
41.606 45.333 38.665 
471.652 465. 772 337.288 
2916.599 
21.000 
41.743 
2819.049 2740.717 
21.000 21.000 
41.048 32.402 
MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP B) 
144.301 
19.912 
128.505 
NA 
91.248 
8326.139 
-0.106 
0.830 
320.721 
22.973 
343.694 
3030.330 
21.000 
39.027 
53.096 
3.526 
55.385 
NA 
16.157 
261.cal 
-0.195 
-0.264 
62.094 
23.323 
65.417 
1114.965 
21.000 
6.910 
53.397 
3.404 
53.465 
NA 
15.601 
243.389 
0.575 
-0.193 
67.465 
17.829 
65.294 
54.668 
2.767 
54.861 
NA 
12.680 
160.789 
-0.357 
0.007 
47.206 
31.111 
78.317 
1121.327 1148.025 
21.000 
6.673 
21.000 
5.423 
53.754 
2.946 
50.896 
NA 
13.501 
182.288 
-0.293 
0.265 
53.056 
29.457 
52.654 
2.972 
50.365 
NA 
13.617 
165.427 
-0.479 
0.333 
51.132 
31.193 
82.513 82.325 
1128.830 1105.741 
21.000 21.000 
5.775 5.824 
53.533 
2.797 
54.034 
NA 
12.817 
164.278 
-0.479 
-0.cn! 
49.149 
27.983 
77.132 
1124.192 
21.000 
5.482 
54.322 
3.645 
58.CEe 
NA 
16.704 
279.015 
-0.557 
-0.503 
58.822 
18.640 
77.462 
1140.753 
21.000 
7.144 
DEIEQB9 DEIEQ90 DE/EQ91 DEIEQ92 DEIEQ93 DEIEQ94 DEIEQ95 TODAS89 TODAS90 TODAS91 TODAS92 TODAS93 TODAS94 TODAS95 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
S1d Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Counl 
Conf Lvl(0.95CXXX 
138.174 
21.271 
127.155 
NA 
97.478 
9501.978 
13.326 
3.305 
465.866 
38.726 
524.592 
2901.657 
21.000 
41.691 
137.380 
20.221 
106.201 
NA 
92.667 
8587.083 
9.940 
2.765 
443.763 
40.304 
484.067 
129.288 125.414 119.352 122.784 
16.007 16.9Cil 15.420 16.625 
113.982 100.588 101.374 111.537 
NA NA NA NA 
77.478 77.458 70.662 76.165 
0002.870 5900. 726 4993.073 5804.086 
9.865 
2.773 
3B0.668 
58.140 
418.806 
4.706 
2.201 
301.052 
56.186 
357.238 
4.002 
1.982 
277.737 
5.062 
2.035 
318.223 
55.028 53.140 
332. 765 371.363 
2884.973 2715.045 2633.690 2506.391 2578.459 
21.000 21.000 
39.633 33.137 
21.000 
33.129 
21.000 
3Cl222 
21.000 
32.584 
• DE/EQ = TOTAL DEBT TO EQUITY 
• TODAS =TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 
118.EEB 
15.156 
105.355 
NA 
69.462 
4823.585 
5.728 
2J157 
305.689 
47.195 
352.883 
2492.654 
21.000 
29.705 
53.850 
2.690 
55.948 
NA 
12.329 
152.011 
1.776 
-0.134 
59.799 
24. 191 
83.990 
1130.840 
21.000 
5.273 
53.618 
2.783 
51.989 
NA 
12.752 
162.604 
0.725 
0.006 
58.270 
24.608 
82.879 
1125.970 
21.000 
5.454 
53.223 
2.347 
53.267 
NA 
10.756 
115.683 
0.597 
0.591 
43.960 
36.765 
52.234 
2.427 
50.900 
NA 
11.123 
123.715 
0.737 
0.872 
42.166 
35.974 
51.088 
2.493 
50.341 
NA 
11.423 
130.488 
0.079 
0.709 
41.408 
35.465 
80.725 78.140 76.893 
1117.673 1006.911 1072.838 
21.000 21.000 21.000 
4.600 4. 757 4.886 
51.378 
2.665 
52.738 
NA 
12.303 
151.368 
-0.379 
0.451 
44.076 
34.700 
78.776 
1078.934 
21.000 
5.262 
50.920 
2.602 
51.301 
NA 
11.923 
142.155 
-0.217 
0.329 
45.856 
32.063 
77.919 
1069.318 
21.000 
5.009 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS !CONTD) • ANNEXUREA5 
OWNER-CONTROLLED COMPANIES !GROUP A) 
L TDAS89 L TDAS90 L TDAS91 L TDAS92 L TDAS93 LTDAS94 LTDAS96 DIVPY89 DIVPY90 DIVPY91 DIVPY92 DIVPY93 DIVPY94 DIVPY96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95000: 
7.896 
1.450 
7.'lfB 
O.CXXJ 
6.646 
44.167 
0.366 
0.859 
22.535 
O.CXXJ 
22.535 
165.824 
21.CXXJ 
2.842 
9.377 
1.262 
8.108 
NA 
5.765 
33.464 
-0.646 
0.3915 
19.684 
0.884 
20.567 
196.926 
21.CXXJ 
2.474 
9.994 
1.386 
8.567 
NA 
6.352 
40.349 
-0.528 
0.501 
22.007 
0.667 
22.674 
209.864 
21.CXXJ 
2.717 
8.793 
1.268 
8.571 
NA 
5.812 
33.778 
-0.956 
0.437 
18.548 
0.476 
19.024 
184.645 
21.CXXJ 
2.486 
MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED COMPANIES (GROUP B) 
8.001 
1.639 
6.900 
NA 
7.510 
56.402 
4.936 
1.874 
32.782 
0.364 
33.146 
180.621 
21.CXXJ 
3.212 
7.388 
1.313 
6.963 
O.CXXJ 
6.015 
36.165 
-0.238 
0.689 
20.486 
O.CXXJ 
20.488 
155.150 
21.CXXJ 
2.573 
7.783 
1.434 
6.581 
O.CXXJ 
6.571 
43.179 
-0.918 
0.551 
20.692 
O.CXXJ 
20.692 
163.443 
21.CXXJ 
2.810 
0.295 
0.039 
0.325 
0.294 
0.178 
0.032 
6.156 
-2.105 
0.855 
-0.303 
0.553 
6.200 
21.CXXJ 
0.o76 
0.302 
0.032 
0.327 
O.CXXJ 
0.146 
0.021 
0.793 
-1.100 
0.505 
O.CXXJ 
0.505 
6.344 
21.CXXJ 
0.062 
0.366 
0.045 
0.$3 
O.CXXJ 
0.206 
0.042 
2.007 
0.779 
0.968 
O.CXXJ 
0.968 
7.677 
21.CXXJ 
0.068 
0.359 
0.047 
0.323 
O.CXXJ 
0.214 
0.046 
2.175 
0.505 
0.!;62 
O.CXXJ 
o.re2 
7.549 
21.CXXJ 
0.092 
0.272 
0.037 
O.:>'.B 
O.CXXJ 
0.168 
0.028 
-0.419 
-0.311 
0.565 
O.CXXJ 
0.565 
5.720 
21.000 
0.072 
0.289 
0.032 
0.278 
0.000 
0.146 
0.022 
0.112 
0.330 
0.600 
0.000 
0.600 
6.078 
21.000 
0.063 
0.306 
0.031 
0.2re 
0.000 
0.144 
0.021 
1.880 
0.730 
0.661 
0.000 
0.661 
6.433 
21.000 
0.062 
L TDAS89 L TDAS90 L TDAS91 L TDAS92 LTDAS93 L TDAS94 LTDAS96 DIVPY89 DIVPY90 DIVPY91 DNPY92 DIVPY93 DIVPY94 DIVPY96 
Mean 
Std Error 
Median 
Mode 
Std Dev 
Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
Conf Lvl(0.95000: 
9.320 
1.262 
7.864 
NA 
5.782 
33.434 
-0.555 
0.736 
19.005 
1.359 
20.364 
1$.716 
21.000 
2.473 
11.438 
1.756 
10.238 
NA 
8.045 
64.729 
2.340 
1.244 
34.321 
0.856 
35.177 
240.208 
21.000 
3.441 
12.541 
1.888 
13.176 
NA 
8.650 
74.819 
-0.790 
0.396 
30.4:l0 
1.061 
31.490 
263.351 
21.000 
3.700 
• L TDAS = LONG-TERM DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 
• DIVPY = DMD END PAY-OUT RA TIO 
11.096 
1.736 
B.678 
NA 
7.955 
63.278 
-1.000 
0.600 
24.633 
1.182 
25.815 
233.013 
21.000 
3.402 
9.761 
1.706 
9.056 
NA 
7.817 
61.100 
-0.632 
0.727 
25.226 
0.829 
26.056 
204.979 
21.000 
3.343 
9.371 
1.881 
6.515 
NA 
8.622 
74.332 
0.397 
1.105 
30.575 
0.765 
31.361 
196.782 
21.CXXJ 
3.687 
7.843 
1.796 
4.744 
NA 
8.238 
67.880 
3.674 
1.833 
32.850 
0.829 
33.679 
164.713 
21.000 
3.523 
0.346 
0.027 
0.364 
0.000 
0.123 
0.015 
2.625 
-0.696 
0.614 
0.000 
0.614 
7.271 
21.000 
0.053 
0.383 
0.026 
0.400 
NA 
0.121 
0.015 
0.020 
0.334 
0.458 
0.172 
0.630 
8.050 
21.000 
0.062 
0.393 
0.030 
0.383 
NA 
0.137 
0.019 
0.712 
a.ere 
0.570 
0.100 
0.730 
8.263 
21.000 
0.059 
0.'121 
0.000 
0.383 
0.000 
0.276 
0.076 
9.362 
2.521 
1.438 
O.CXXJ 
1.438 
8.833 
21.000 
0.118 
0.408 
0.000 
0.377 
O.CXXJ 
0.276 
0.o76 
10.792 
2.781 
1.452 
0.000 
1.452 
8.558 
21.CXXJ 
0.118 
0.361 
0.030 
0.380 
0.000 
0.139 
0.019 
1.237 
-0.630 
0.588 
0.000 
0.588 
7.584 
21.000 
0.059 
0.332 
0.027 
0.373 
0.000 
0.124 
O.Q15 
1.255 
-0.907 
0.528 
0.000 
0.528 
6.966 
21.000 
0.053 
